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NOTES
IF MEN COULD GET PREGNANT:
AN EQUAL PROTECTION MODEL FOR FEDERAL
FUNDING OF ABORTION UNDER A NATIONAL
HEALTH CARE PLAN
No woman can call herself free who does not own and control her
body. No woman can call herself free until she can choose
consciously whether she will or will not be a mother.1
INTRODUCTION
Sheila was 23 years old and on public assistance when she
became pregnant for the second time. She had given birth to
her first daughter just five months earlier and since then had
spent her days taking care of her. Sheila supported herself and
her daughter on the $85 left from her monthly Aid to Families
with Dependent Children ("AFDC") check of $435, after paying
$350 toward her monthly rent. The man involved in the preg-
nancy provided no child support for the couple's first child.
Sheila did not want another child, but she had become preg-
nant again despite care in using two forms of contraception,
oral and injected.2
1 Margaret H. Sanger (1913), quoted in THE BEACON BOOK OF QUOTATIONS BY
WOMEN 31 (compiled by Rosalie Maggio, 1992) [hereinafter QUOTATIONS BY
WOMEN].
2 Affidavit of Kelly Lynch at 5, Women of the State of Minnesota v. Natalie
Haas-Steffen, No. MC-93-3995 (D. Minn. filed June 23, 1993).
The injectable synthetic hormone progestin, known as Depo-Provera, provides
effective contraception for several months after injection. Depo-Provera has been
the subject of controversy because of the medical risks of its use, but is currently
available to women in the United States. For a discussion of the political debate
over the availability of Depo-Provera and its experimental use on minority women
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Like many women living in poverty, Sheila did not want to
carry her second pregnancy to term, but could not afford an
abortion. Sheila was receiving AFDC, and most of her medical
care was paid for by Medicaid, but this coverage would not
fund her abortion. Although the Medicaid program was de-
signed to meet the health care needs of low-income women like
Sheila, since 1977 the Hyde Amendment has excluded nearly
all federal funding of abortion.3 The Hyde Amendment has
varied in content since its inception, but since June 1981 has
allowed Medicaid funding of abortion only "where the life of
the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to
term."' The conditions of Sheila's pregnancy-poverty, a young
child to care for and no desire for another-were not consid-
ered life-threatening, so Sheila was ineligible for abortion
funding.
These Hyde Amendment restrictions were upheld by the
Supreme Court in Harris v. McRae.5 The Court stated that
denying Medicaid funding for even medically necessary abor-
tions is rationally related to the state's goals and, therefore,
does not violate the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses of
the Constitution.6 In the years following Harris, the Court has
ruled on a number of abortion restrictions, none of which has
directly addressed the issue of federal funding of abortion.
Ultimately, when the Court has addressed reproductive rights
and women in developing nations, see ROSALIND P. PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND
WOMAN'S CHOICE 176-77 (1984), and RUTH SIDEL, WOMEN AND CHILDREN LAST
138-39 (1986).
' See Subchapter XIX of the Social Security Act, 79 Stat. 343, codified as
amended 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1976). Departments of Labor, Health and Human Ser-
vices, and Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1993, Pub. L.
No. 102-394, § 203, 106 Stat. 1792, 1811 (1992) [hereinafter Hyde Amendment].
' Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 332 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
448 U.S. 297 (1980).
Harris, 448 U.S. at 299. The equal protection doctrine is derived from the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. The Fifth Amendment
states: "No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment extends
equal protection guarantees to the states:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges and immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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issues, it has failed to scrutinize adequately the government's
actions. Furthermore, the Court's analysis has failed to recog-
nize that a lack of funding will deprive many impoverished
women of access to abortion.
Sheila's case is typical. Denial of Medicaid funding cur-
tails access to abortion for low-income women and may com-
pletely bar them from the power to choose abortion. Worse, it
propels them to even more desperate "choices": facing the risk
of an inexpensive illegal abortion or the danger of trying to
self-abort. Other alternatives include attempting to raise funds
for an abortion, going without food or other necessities, or
putting one's health at risk by carrying the unwanted or un-
safe pregnancy to term.' When the practical effects of denying
federal funding are considered, the true hardships and health
risks for women like Sheila become apparent.
Part I of this Note examines the practical effects of the
Hyde Amendment's denial of abortion funding, with an empha-
sis on how it endangers women's lives, restricts reproductive
health care choices for low-income women, and dispropor-
tionately harms women from minority groups. This Note ar-
gues that restrictions on access to abortion, such as funding
bans, force women to delay securing abortion services, thereby
endangering their physical and mental health, and increasing
the cost and hardship of abortion. Furthermore, this Note
argues that when low-income women are denied abortion fund-
ing, the constitutional right to choose abortion becomes mere
rhetoric.
Part II of this Note proposes an alternative interpretation
of the equal protection doctrine and applies it to an analysis of
abortion funding restrictions. The analysis emphasizes that the
level of scrutiny that the Court has employed to decide wheth-
er legislation violates reproductive rights is inadequate. The
government's goal of protecting the non-viable fetus without re-
gard to a woman's well-being should not satisfy any equal
protection standard. Therefore, Part II concludes that federal
funding of abortion services is required under a modified equal
protection analysis.
' See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 346 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See
infra notes 47-76 for a discussion of the results of denying abortion funding for
low-income women.
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Specifically, the revised form of the equal protection guar-
antees proposed in this Note would require the use of the high-
est level of scrutiny when considering legislation that affects
women as a class. This analysis also de-emphasizes a showing
of purposeful discrimination, instead focusing on the discrimi-
natory effects of the challenged legislation. Using this analysis,
the Court would give greater weight to the discriminatory
impact of legislation that on its face does not explicitly classify
people by gender. The result would be that if a statute consid-
ered facially neutral by the Court-such as the Hyde
Amendment-is shown to affect women as a class and does not
serve a compelling state interest, it would be struck as viola-
tive of equal protection guarantees. This analysis, based on the
practical effects of denying abortion funding, would expand
equal protection rights for all women.
Finally, Part III of this Note looks toward the future of
abortion-funding regulations and considers the possibility of re-
strictions on reproductive health care within the proposed
national health care plan. Legislative proposals that determine
funding of reproductive health care-the new national health
care plan being the most imminent example-offer an opportu-
nity to reexamine abortion restrictions and to design legislative
solutions to correct the Court's support of limited access to
abortion services. A new national health care plan must in-
clude funding for a full range of reproductive health care ser-
vices. To deny such funding constructs a major impediment to
the right to choose an abortion and, therefore, should be chal-
lenged as violative of equal protection guarantees. An analysis
of this harmful policy should begin with a look at the women
who bear the brunt of a wrongful legislative decision.
[Vol. 60: 349
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I. THE EFFECT OF DENYING ABORTION FUNDING TO Low-
INCOME WOMEN
A. Medicaid Eligibility and Abortion Funding
Medicaid provides health insurance for "the poorest of poor
Americans."' By definition, women who receive Medicaid can-
not afford to pay for their own health care. To be eligible for
Medicaid, most recipients must be well below the federal pov-
erty level? As of 1993, the Medicaid program, which was first
established in 1965, had approximately 31 million enrollees. °
Depending on the final structure of the proposed national
health care plan, the Clinton Administration estimates that
Medicaid eventually could be phased out entirely." Until
then, the Medicaid program will continue to dictate the health
care choices of Americans whose income level is low enough to
make them eligible for these benefits.
A person's Medicaid eligibility is derived from his or her
income eligibility for AFDC. This rate is set by each state. The
national average income for AFDC eligibility is approximately
50% of the federal poverty level-under $12,000 for a single
parent family of three. 2 Thus, if a woman earns more than
' The Cost Implications of Including Abortion Coverage Under Medicaid, IS-
SUES IN BRIEF (Alan Guttmacher Inst., New York, N.Y.), Oct. 1993, at 1 [hereinaf-
ter Cost Implications].
9 The Medicaid program is designed to provide "medical assistance on behalf
of families with dependent children and of aged, blind, or disabled individuals,
whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical
services." 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (introductory paragraph).
"0 Cost Implications, supra note 8, at 1. "In 1990, Medicaid covered approxi-
mately 11% of the total U.S. population . .. and 47% of those with incomes below
the Federal Poverty Level." HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, OVERVIEW OF
ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS: 1993 GREEN BOOK, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 1637 (1993).
Because eligibility requirements for children are less restrictive than those for
adults, children from low-income families are more likely to receive coverage. Id.
"1 Under the proposed national health care plan, Medicaid would be eliminat-
ed-except for long-term care for the elderly and the disabled-and would be re-
placed by pooling recipients into the national plan. Dan Morgan, Expanded Medi-
cal Safety Net Still Has Holes, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 1994, at Al.
12 Cost Implications, supra note 8, at 1. For example, in Alabama a person
who earns more than 17% of the federal poverty level is not eligible for Medicaid,
while in California a person whose income is less than 94% of the federal poverty
level is eligible for Medicaid. Id. at 2. Twenty-six states place eligibility at or
19941
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$6000 a year, she and her dependents would not be eligible for
AFDC nor Medicaid. 3
Twenty-one years after it created the Medicaid program,
Congress changed the statute to underscore the needs of preg-
nant women. Although Medicaid eligibility is generally linked
to AFDC income qualifications, in 1986 Congress expanded
coverage for pregnant women.' It relaxed the eligibility re-
quirements to include pregnant women with higher incomes
and those whose family structure had made them ineligible for
AFDC before they became pregnant.15 By expanding eligibility
requirements, Congress has acknowledged the special needs of
pregnant women. But Congressional support of pregnant, low-
income women has been very selective. Even though Medicaid
funding covers a full range of pregnancy testing, pre-natal care
and post-birth care for pregnant women, Congress wavered on
the abortion issue. Congress has denied funding for almost all
women who choose abortion by amending the Medicaid appro-
priations each year.
16
Congress first restricted Medicaid funding for women who
choose abortion when it enacted the Hyde Amendment in 1977.
In 1980, the Supreme Court upheld the amendment. 7 By
amending annual HHS appropriations bills and by joint resolu-
tion, Congress has continued a version of the Hyde Amend-
ment every year since its introduction.'" The Hyde
below 50% of the federal poverty level. Id. at 1.
13 Medicaid is jointly funded by the federal and state governments. The federal
government reimburses states for a portion of their Medicaid expenditures accord-
ing to a rate established by the Department of Health and Human Services
("HHS"). Rachel B. Gold & Daniel Daley, Public Funding of Contraceptive, Steril-
ization and Abortion Services, Fiscal Year 1990, 23 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 204, 204-05
(1991). The cost of Medicaid cannot be determined by direct congressional appro-
priation because spending is determined by the type and amount of care required
and the number of eligible recipients. Id.
14 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)ClX) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
15 Id.; see also Gold & Daley, supra note 13, at 204. ("States are now required
to provide Medicaid coverage to pregnant women (and their children up to age six)
with incomes up to 133 percent of the federal poverty level; pregnant women (and
their infants up to age one) with incomes up to 185 percent of poverty may be
covered at the states' discretion.").
16 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
17 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 298 (1980).
'6 Ensuring Reproductive Freedom: Proposals to the President and the 103d
Congress: Removing Barriers to Reproductive Health Care, REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM
IN Focus (Center for Reproductive Law & Pol'y, New York, N.Y.), 1993, at 11
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Amendment contains few exceptions to the absolute ban on
abortion funding, and since its inception they have varied
slightly.
Earlier versions of the Hyde Amendment provided funding
for abortion if a woman was pregnant as a result of rape or
incest, but only if she had reported the incident to law enforce-
ment officials within 60 days of its occurrence. 9 In 1981, the
reporting requirement was reduced to allow a woman only 72
hours to report the incident. In 1982, the rape-incest exception
to the Hyde Amendment was eliminated entirely.0 In 1993,
however, the rape-incest exception was reinstated as part of a
compromise solution during Congressional debate over the
complete elimination of the Amendment, although the status of
the reporting requirement remained uncertain.2 '
While a mandatory reporting requirement may appear to
be reasonable, in practice it discourages women from seeking
abortion funding. The reporting requirement itself may in-
crease a woman's trauma.2 2 If a woman does know the identi-
ty of her attacker, she may not wish to reveal it for fear of
repercussion or retaliation. In cases of incest, these fears are
particularly prevalent. In addition, a woman may not report
that she is the victim of rape or incest because she may not
want to see her attacker prosecuted. Finally, a woman may not
realize within a limited time period that she is pregnant as a
(The 1976 Hyde Amendment for fiscal year 1977 was enjoined by court order until
1978 and for a seven months in 1980. In 1980, the Supreme Court, in Harris,
upheld the Hyde Amendment as constitutional.) [hereinafter Ensuring Reproductive
Freedom]; see also ALAN GUTrMACHER INST., CHRONOLOGY OF ABORTION RESTRIc-
TIONS ENACTED BY CONGRESS: 1970-1992 48 (1993) [hereinafter CHRONOLOGY OF
ABORTION RESTRICTIONS].
19 CHRONOLOGY OF ABORTION RESTRICTIONS, supra note 18, at 48.
20 Hyde Amendment, supra note 3. See Pub. L. No. 97-12, § 109, 95 Stat. 95
(1981).
2 Hyde Amendment, supra note 3. See Pub. L. No. 103-112, § 509, 107 Stat.
113 (1993). In December 1993, although the 1993 rape-incest provision of the Hyde
Amendment did not contain a reporting requirement, a federal directive declared
that states could not use reporting requirements or state Medicaid regulations to
deny Medicaid payments for abortions in these cases. Several states, however, re-
fuse to obey this directive and continue to deny abortion funding in cases of rape
and incest. See William E. Clayton Jr., States Must Fund Charity Abortions: New
Federal Policy Takes Precedence, HOUS. "CHRON., Jan. 7, 1994, at A2; Robert Pear,
Pennsylvania Defies U.S. Abortion Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1994, at A12.
'2 See Affidavit of Dr. Jane Hodgson at 19, Women of Minnesota v. Haas-
Steffen, No. MC-93-3995 (D. Minn. filed June 23, 1993).
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result of a rape, or she may be in shock or suffering from trau-
ma. In addition to its discouraging effects, the reporting re-
quirement inherently distrusts women as it presumes that
they are lying about rape in order to obtain abortion fund-
ing.2
3
The Hyde Amendment has also varied as to whether it
will allow funding for "medically necessary" abortions. An
abortion is generally considered "medically necessary" only if
the woman's life or health would be endangered if she were
forced to carry her pregnancy to term. From 1978 to 1979, the
Hyde Amendment provided Medicaid funding of abortion if
carrying the pregnancy to term would put the woman at risk of
"severe health damage," but subsequent revisions deleted this
provision.24 The current Hyde Amendment excludes funding
for "medically necessary" abortions except where necessary to
save the life of a pregnant woman.
The requirement that a life-threatening condition exist
before funding is allowed ignores pregnant women who suffer
from a wide range of hazardous and debilitating condi-
tions-including AIDs or cancer-none of which the Hyde
Amendment considers "life-threatening" per se.25 Further-
more, it is often difficult for physicians to determine exactly
when the continuation of a pregnancy would be damaging
enough to threaten a woman's life.26 Even if forced pregnancy
2 Such reporting requirements are insulting to women as they "call into ques-
tion the credibility of all women, and imply that women will lie about rape or
incest in order to obtain Medicaid funding." Medicaid Funding and Reporting Re-
quirements, FACT SHEET (National Abortion Rights Action League ("NARAL"),
Washington, D.C.), 1990, at 1.
For a general analysis of the inflated assertion that women and girls lie
about rape and incest, see HELEN BENEDICT, VIRGIN OR VAMP: How THE PRESS
COVERS SEX CRIMES 18 (1992) ("The tendency of women to lie about rape is vastly
exaggerated in popular opinion. The FBI finds that 8 percent of reported rapes are
unfounded, but other researchers put the figure at only 2 percent."). See also SU-
SAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987).
24 See CHRONOLOGY OF ABORTION RESTRICTIONS, supra note 18, at 36-40.
21 "For women with AIDS or cancer even a slight decrease in health may be
life-threatening .... Yet an abortion in the case of a pregnant woman with AIDS
would not qualify [for federal abortion funding] . . . both because it will not pre-
vent her death (i.e., it will not cure the underlying disease) and because it is
difficult to predict the extent to which continuing the pregnancy will damage her
health." Affidavit of Dr. Jane Hodgson, supra note 22, at 29-30. See also infra
notes 54-55 for a discussion of the possible medical dangers of pregnancy.
26 "[A] physician cannot know with certainty that a particular procedure is
[Vol. 60: 349
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does not cause physical harm, the psychological effects may be
devastating. Justice Stevens's dissent in Harris denounced the
provision, noting that "[blecause a denial of benefits for medi-
cally necessary abortions inevitably causes serious harm to the
excluded women, it is tantamount to severe punishment."27 A
woman's physical and mental health is so devalued that the
government will not provide abortion funding unless her ill-
ness progresses to the point of being life-threatening.
In contrast to the Hyde Amendment's prohibition of fund-
ing for virtually all abortion services, the Medicaid program
does cover pregnancy-related care. If a woman does decide to
carry her pregnancy to term, whether by choice or due to a
lack of alternatives, the federal government offers her financial
support. This distinction puts excess pressure and persuasion
on low-income women and has a tremendous impact on their
lives and reproductive choices.28  Moreover, the Hyde
Amendment's "pro-motherhood" efforts to encourage low-in-
come women to continue unwanted pregnancies contrasts
sharply with state policies that deny benefit increases for wom-
en who become pregnant while on AFDC."
'necessary to prevent the death' of his or her patient; rather, a physician can only
assess the risk of death. The definition . . . does not give any guidance as to how
high the risk of death must be for the exception to apply, or if the risk of death
has to be eliminated completely, rather than simply reduced by the abortion, in
order for the exception to apply." Affidavit of Dr. Jane Hodgson, supra note 22, at
26.
27 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 354 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
21 See infra notes 44-71 (showing the tremendous impact of denial of abortion
funding). "By singling out abortion as the only pregnancy-related procedure denied
to Medicaid recipients, the Hyde Amendment has had devastating consequences for
low-income women's lives." CHRONOLOGY OF ABORTION RESTRICTIONS, supra note
18, at 11 (citing James Trussell et al., The Impact of Restricting Medicaid Financ-
ing for Abortion, 12 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 120, 120-21 (1980)).
2' Many states are beginning to implement policies called "family caps" or
"children's disallowances" under which families on AFDC will not have their grants
increased for children conceived while the mother received welfare. See Center for
Law & Social Policy ("CLASP"), HHS Approves Wisconsin and Georgia Waivers, in
STATES UPDATE: A CLASP REPORT ON STATE WELFARE REFORM DEVELOPMENTS
(Jodie Levin-Epstein ed., 1993). Such an approach to welfare, when combined with
a denial of Medicaid funding of abortion, is both nonsensical and cruel. Low-in-
come women are faced with a situation where they cannot afford abortion funding,
yet if they have another child the government will not increase their AFDC pay-
ment to pay this child's expenses. Ultimately, this policy penalizes entire families
and does not facilitate its goal of reducing the number of children that women on
AFDC may have.
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For all its inequity and negative impact on impoverished
women, the Hyde Amendment went virtually unchallenged
during the Reagan and Bush Administrations. Between 1980
and 1992, the federal government created a large number of
federal statutes, regulations and policies-including many not
specifically related to health issues-that placed restrictions on
abortion funding.0 Since his election, however, President
Clinton has reversed some of this legislation and expanded
both access to information for patients at clinics that receive
federal funding and abortion services for federal employees.31
In addition, an increased number of women elected to Con-
gress, combined with the election of a pro-choice president,
dramatically expanded Congressional debate on the Hyde
Amendment." Although Congress still voted to continue the
Hyde Amendment, a provision for funding abortions in cases of
reported rape or incest was reinstated into the bill.33
The current version of the Hyde Amendment allows indi-
vidual states to provide state funding for a full range of abor-
tion services for low-income women. Yet, only twenty states
continue, either voluntarily or under court order, to pay for
abortion services for low-income women beyond those neces-
3' CHRONOLOGY OF ABORTION RESTRICTIONS, supra note 18, at 1. For example,
Congress has also enacted the Adolescent Family Life Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300 z-10(a)
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992), which prohibits any discussion of abortion in sex educa-
tion programs; the Helms Amendment, 22 U.S.C. § 2151b(f)(3), (f)(1) (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992), 48 C.F.R. § 752.7016(b) (1992), 48 C.F.R. § 752.7004(d)(4) (1992),
barring use of Foreign Assistance Act funds for abortions, and the Restrictions on
Abortion Related Advocacy with Funds made available for the Legal Services Cor-
poration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b)(8) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
" President Clinton has used the executive power to reverse some of the do-
mestic and international anti-abortion policies enacted during the Reagan and
Bush administrations. Domestically, he reversed the "gag rule," which mandated
that counselors at federally funded family planning clinics could not mention abor-
tion as an option for women with unwanted pregnancies. Additionally, the Clinton
administration is facilitating importation of RU486, an abortifacient, and has re-
cently signed into law federal protections for abortion clinics.
In the area of foreign policy, President Clinton lifted the "Mexico City Policy,"
thereby restoring funding to overseas birth control programs that offered abortion,
and also rescinded a ban on military hospitals performing abortions overseas. Lynn
Smith, Bowed, But Unbroken?, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1993, at El.
12 See, e.g., Planning for the Abortion Debates, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 1993, at
A20; Karen Schneider, House Retains Ban on Funding of Abortions for the Poor,
PHIL. INQUIRER, July 1, 1993, at Al; Karen Tumulty, Abortion Funds Ban Re-
tained in House Test, L.A. TnIES, July 1, 1993, at Al.
' See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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sary to save a woman's life.34 In several states, the denial of
funding for abortion has been successfully challenged on state
constitutional grounds.35 Although a number of states have
continued abortion funding for Medicaid recipients despite the
Hyde Amendment, public funding for abortion has decreased
dramatically since the ban on federal funding. 6 By 1987, only
twelve percent of all abortions were paid for with public funds,
According to the Center for Reproductive Law and Policy ("CRLP"):
The least restrictive states are Arizona, California, Connecticut, Massa-
chusetts, New York, Washington, and West Virginia. Hawaii, Oregon, and
Vermont fund all medically necessary abortions. New Jersey provides
abortions necessary to preserve a Medicaid recipients life or health.
North Carolina funds abortions in cases of rape, incest, severe fetal
anomaly, or where the woman's health will be impaired; Maryland funds
abortions where the pregnancy is the result of rape or incest, where a
fetal anomaly exists, or if continued pregnancy will have serious adverse
effects on the woman's physical or mental health. Wisconsin will fund
abortions in cases of reported rape or incest, or if the pregnancy will
have serious health consequences for a women [sic] due to a prior exist-
ing condition. Iowa and Virginia fund abortions if a severe fetal anomaly
exists or where the pregnancy is the result of rape or incest. Minnesota
and Wyoming fund abortions where the pregnancy is the result of report-
ed rape or incest. Pennsylvania funds abortions where the pregnancy is
the result or rape or incest or where continuing the pregnancy imposes a
threat to the woman's life. Previously one of the least restrictive states,
Alaska recently approved regulations that will limit state funding for
abortion, but have not yet taken effect.
Ensuring Reproductive Freedom, supra note 18, at 12 n.35. A number of challenges
to a denial of abortion funding are being brought on state constitutional grounds
as of this writing. See, e.g., Women of Minnesota v. Haas-Steffen, No. MC-93-3995
(D. Minn. filed June 23, 1993).
" In many states, the denial of funding for abortion has been overturned by
expanding equal protection guarantees through state constitutional grounds. See
Carole A. Corns, The Impact of Public Abortion Funding Decisions on Indigent
Women: A Proposal to Reform State Statutory and Constitutional Abortion Funding
Provisions, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 371, 390-95 (1991); see also Judy L. Popper,
Note, New Jersey Statute Prohibiting Medicaid Funding for Abortions Except Where
Medically Necessary to Preserve Life of the Mother Violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the New Jersey Constitution, 56 TEMP. L.Q. 983 (1983). State constitu-
tions may contain identical language to the federal constitution, yet be interpreted
to grant greater protections to women. See Judith S. Kaye, Celebrating Our Other
Constitution, 60 N.Y. ST. B.J. 8, 8-9, 73, 78 (1988).
"6 For example, during the first year that the Hyde Amendment was in effect,
the number of publicly subsidized abortions dropped from approximately 295,000 to
194,000. Stanley I. Henshaw & Lynn S. Wallisch, The Medicaid Cutoff and Abor-
tion Services for the Poor, 16 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 170, 171 (1984). After the Hyde
Amendment, most public funding for abortion came from the states, not the feder-
al government. By 1990, the number of federally funded abortions was 165. Gold
& Daley, supra note 13, at 209.
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and most of this funding was provided by the states.
In addition to state medical assistance, private funding
sources exist to try to meet the abortion needs of low-income
women. But these resources meet just a fraction of the demand
for abortion funding.3 Minnesota's Pro-Choice Resources is
the largest such abortion assistance fund in the United States
and is supported solely by private donations. This organization
distributes approximately $10,000 per month in grants and
loans to low-income women to help cover the cost of abortion
services.3 9 Like other organizations nationwide that provide
funding for women in need of abortion services, Pro-Choice Re-
sources frequently fails to fill all of the requests it receives."
Other private funding sources include clinics and practitio-
ners who will lower or waive their fees for low-income women.
For example, many abortion providers in the Minneapolis area
will lower their fees for women who are referred to them by
Pro-Choice Resources.4' Unfortunately, lowering abortion fees
sometimes jeopardizes the financial stability of such clinics. As
a result, these clinics must often postpone their efforts to ex-
pand services into other areas of reproductive health care,
including contraceptive services and services for the prevention
of sexually transmitted diseases.4
Medicaid-eligible women, who by definition are living in
poverty, lack the funds necessary to pay for reproductive
health care, including abortion services. Because the federal
government refuses to pay these costs, women are often com-
pletely denied access to abortion services or face delays that
increase the health risks of abortion. Low-income women en-
" Abortion in the United States, FACTS IN BRIEF (Alan Guttmacher Inst., New
York, N.Y.), Mar. 15, 1993, at 1. During the Reagan-Bush presidencies, in addition
to the decrease in abortion funding, federal funding for contraceptive services was
severely curtailed. Once inflation is factored in, federal expenditures for family
planning services have fallen by almost two-thirds since 1980. Gold & Daley, su-
pra note 13, at 204.
'8 See Affidavit of Kelly Lynch, supra note 2, at 18.
Affidavit of Kelly Lynch, supra note 2, at 2.
40 Affidavit of Kelly Lynch, supra note 2, at 3.
41 See Affidavit of Katherine G. Welsh at 3, Women of Minnesota v. Haas-
Steffen, No. MC-93-3995 (D. Minn. filed June 23, 1993); Affidavit of Pamela Gal-
lop, at 2, Haas-Steffen.
42 See Affidavit of Katherine G. Welsh, supra note 41, at 8 ("Because we feel
compelled to reduce and waive fees for women on medical assistance who cannot
pay for abortions, we are forced to cut costs in other areas.").
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counter significant additional barriers which perpetuate a two-
tiered system of health care delivery.
B. The Hardship of Delayed or Expensive Abortion
The hardships which low-income women encounter as a
result of the government's refusal to provide abortion funding
fall into two categories: medical risks and personal suffering.
The medical risks of pregnancy are well known; the personal
hardships are more difficult to quantify. Low-income women
who, by definition, lack access to funds, may try a variety of
desperate methods to raise the money needed for an abor-
tion. 3 As public funding for abortion has decreased and pri-
vate funding sources are limited, however, many pregnant,
low-income women must waste vast amounts of time trying to
locate organizations or individuals to provide such services.
Moreover, a woman who postpones her abortion while trying to
raise funds increases the danger and expense of her abortion.
The cost of obtaining an abortion increases as the pregnancy
progresses.
A fairly common scenario occurs where a woman who
cannot afford an abortion is caught in a cycle- in which she
spends time trying to raise money while the costs increase and
her pregnancy advances. One recent study indicated that when
Medicaid-eligible women experienced delay, they had abortions
two to three weeks later than other women in the same clin-
ic." This delay increases the risks associated with abortion
which in turn may be exasperated by a shortage of abortion
services.
Indeed, the cost of an abortion may act as a total bar to
obtaining abortion services for low-income women. Several
factors influence the price of an abortion, including length of
pregnancy, availability of local facilities, and the type of facili-
ty and procedure used.4" Almost all abortion providers require
payment in advance. The least expensive abortion, a first-tri-
mester, out-patient procedure, usually costs between $200 and
4a See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
" Henshaw & Wallisch, supra note 36, at 170 (study of the effect of ban on
Medicaid funding at a clinic in St. Louis, Missouri.).
45 NATIONAL ABORTION FED'N, ECONOMICS OF ABORTION (Ann T. Cook ed.,
1991).
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$300.46 Second trimester abortions range from $350 to $450;
after the 16th week the cost goes up approximately $100 per
week, with a maximum fee usually not over $1200. 4' The fees
especially burden poorer women, since the average cost of $250
for an early pregnancy can be a significant portion of their
income. In fact, an outpatient abortion costs nearly two-thirds
of the average maximum monthly AFDC payment for a family
of three." Raising these funds severely taxes Medicaid-eligi-
ble women.
These women must endure greater hardship because of the
unanticipated expense of abortion. Since many women who
receive AFDC already cannot meet the costs of daily life, the
expense of $200 or more for an abortion can be devastating.
Struggling to raise abortion funds, these women skimp on
necessary items for their families, skip paying rent or utility
bills, pawn household goods or personal items, or use money
set aside for their families' food and clothing.49 Borrowing
money from friends or partners-who are themselves often
without funds-puts them further in debt.5 ° The pressure of
an advancing pregnancy may push them into illegal activities,
such as fraudulently claiming someone else's insurance, or
committing theft or prostitution, to raise funds.51 Many low-
income women will jeopardize their future or security by
spending their entire savings to pay for an abortion: It is "im-
possible to know the consequences for the women and their
families if their depleted savings later became needed for
emergencies."52 Each individual Medicaid-eligible woman is
forced to make painful and sometimes tragic sacrifices to pay
for an abortion.
46 Id.
47 Id.
"' Cost Implications, supra note 8, at 2 ("This amount does not include the cost
of transportation which can be considerable in areas of the country where abortion
services are few and far between. In 27 states, the cost of an abortion is more
than two-thirds the maximum monthly AFDC payment, and in nine states, it is
higher than a family's entire monthly allotment.").
"' See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 346 n.7 (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Henshaw & Wallisch, supra note 36, at 170-71; Affidavit of Katherine R. Welsh,
supra note 41, at 3.
50 Affidavit of Katherine G. Welsh, supra note 41, at 3.
5 Affidavit of Katherine G. Welsh, supra note 41, at 3.
52 Henshaw & Wallisch, supra note 36, at 178; see also Harris, 448 U.S. at 346
n.7 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Affidavit of Katherine R. Welsh, supra note 41, at 3.
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A delay in obtaining an abortion may also force a woman
to carry her pregnancy to term if it causes her to postpone her
abortion until it becomes too advanced to get a legal abortion.
Moreover, forced pregnancy imposes undue physical and psy-
chological burdens on women and their families. When abor-
tion funding is unavailable or is delayed too long, some women
may "in desperation, undergo unsafe illegal or self-induced
abortions, or even attempt suicide."53 Thus, the detrimental
psychological, medical and financial effects of denying Medic-
aid funding for abortion services for low-income women multi-
ply.
Abortion is often safer than carrying a pregnancy to term.
Significant advances in medical technology and increased ac-
cess to high quality services during the past twenty years have
made abortion one of the safest medical procedures.54 In fact,
an abortion during the first trimester is considerably safer
than carrying a pregnancy to term.55 A denial of abortion
funding invariably results in some delay in obtaining an abor-
tion."6
Moreover, since earlier abortion is safer, any delay in
obtaining abortion services increases health risks. Research
reaffirms the need for government funding and involvement in
providing reproductive health care services. According to one
study, when abortion is not publicly funded, 20% of Medicaid-
Affidavit of Dr. Jane Hodgson, supra note 22, at 6.
' Safety of Abortion, FACT SHEET (National Abortion Fed'n, Washington, D.C.),
April 1990, at 1; see also Abortion in the United States, supra note 37, at 2 ("The
risk of death associated with abortion decreased more than fivefold from 1973 to
1985, with 3.4 deaths per 100,000 legal abortions in 1973 to 0.4 in 1985.");
PETCHESKY, supra note 2, at 156-57.
" Safety of Abortion, supra note 54, at 1 ("According to the most recent sta-
tistics available, only 1 of 200,000 women who have legal abortions die. That is
one seventh the number of women who die from childbirth . . . ."); see also Abor-
tion in the United States, supra note 37, at 2 ("The risk of death associated with
childbirth is about 11 times as high as that associated with abortion."); Affidavit
of Dr. Jane Hodgson, supra note 22, at 7-12 (If a woman experiences complica-
tions-such as hypertension, congenital heart disease or diabetes-the continuation
of a pregnancy can be more risky than an abortion.); AMA Council on Scientific
Affairs, Induced Termination of Pregnancy Before and After Roe v. Wade: Trends in
the Mortality and Morbidity of Women, 268 JAMA 3231 (1992).
"' See Affidavit of Katherine R. Welsh, supra note 41, at 3 ("Many low-income
women make and cancel several appointments while they try to gather the funds
to pay even part of the fee. As a result, some women are delayed several weeks
while they try to raise the money for the procedure.").
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eligible women who would choose to have an abortion instead
carry their pregnancy to term.57 Later-term abortions simply
are less safe. For example, women are sixteen times more
likely to die of an abortion performed in the sixteenth week
than in the eighth week of pregnancy." An abortion past the
thirteenth week may require a more complicated and danger-
ous procedure than an abortion earlier in the pregnancy. 9 It
is more likely to require a hospital stay or a higher dose of
anesthesia. Because pregnancy may involve more of a health
risk than abortion, a woman may choose a first trimester abor-
tion for health reasons.
Safety is not a reason for every woman to choose to abort a
pregnancy rather than carry it to term. But a woman must be
able to choose if she is willing to accept the health risks of
continuing her pregnancy, particularly if she has pre-existing
medical conditions, such as diabetes or multiple sclerosis,
which would be exacerbated. The inequity is clear. By denying
access to abortion funding, the government forces a low-income
woman to take a health risk which her wealthier counterpart
need not take, simply because she cannot afford the price of an
abortion."
5 Abortion in the United States, supra note 37, at 2.
Janet Benshoof, Planned Parenthood v. Casey: The Impact of the New Undue
Burden Standard on Reproductive Health Care, 269 JAMA 2249, 2254 (1993); see
also Abortion After Twelve Weeks, FACT SHEET (National Abortion Fed'n, Washing-
ton, D.C.), Oct. 1992, at 1 ("Ideally, all abortions should be performed at 7 or 8
weeks of pregnancy when the procedure is safest."); Abortion in the United States,
supra note 37, at 2 ("The risk of death associated with abortion increases with the
length of pregnancy, from 1 death for every 500,000 abortions at 8 weeks or less
to 1 per 30,000 at 16-20 weeks and 1 per 8,000 at 21 or more weeks.").
"' What Is Abortion?, FACT SHEET (National Abortion Fed'n, Washington, D.C.),
1992, at 1 (ending the pregnancy mid-second trimester is more difficult and the
procedure requires more skill of the physician).
"' 'Worse yet, the Hyde Amendment does not foist that majoritarian [anti-abor-
tion] viewpoint with equal measure upon everyone in our Nation, rich and poor
alike; rather it imposes that viewpoint only upon that segment of our society
which, because of its position of political powerlessness, is least able to defend its
privacy rights from the encroachments of state-mandated morality." Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 332 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting). This distinction "seems
particularly immoral when the line between the two groups is based on something
as unrelated to the situation of the pregnancy or to any right of the unborn, and
as frequently beyond a woman's control, as personal wealth." LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 207 (1990).
In sharp contrast, the government in effect subsidizes abortion for wealthier
women by allowing tax deductions for private health insurance plans, the vast
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Beyond the expense of abortion there is a severe shortage
of abortion services, particularly for women requiring later
abortions. Late-term or complicated abortions may require
hospitalization or expensive special services that a clinic may
be unable to provide. This shortage further reduces access for
those women who face delays. Abortion may become unobtain-
able for a woman who experiences funding-related delays if her
pregnancy advances beyond the category of services provided
locally.
An unequal geographic concentration of abortion services
in non-rural areas further restricts access to abortion, particu-
larly for low-income women. In the United States, most abor-
tion providers are concentrated in urban areas, while 83% of
counties in the country do not have any abortion services.6
This shortage of providers means that women in rural areas
often must pay large transportation costs and travel arduous
distances to reach abortion services." To deliver health care
services successfully to those in need, any proposed national
health care system must redress both the geographic inequities
of the distribution of health care and the lack of physicians
specializing in the area of reproductive health care.63
The denial of abortion funding does not affect women of all
races equally. Bans on abortion funding affect women of color
more than white women because they are more likely to be in
poverty and more likely to seek an abortion. Specifically, wom-
en of color are "vastly overrepresented among the poor," with
families of color more than three times as likely to live in pov-
erty as are white families." Additionally, although white
women account for 65% of all abortions, women of color have
majority of which cover abortion.
01 Abortion After Twelve Weeks, supra note 58, at 2.
62 See, e.g., Abortion After Twelve Weeks, supra note 58, at 2 ("In several
states, some women in need of abortion care must travel hundreds of miles to
reach the nearest provider. Women are often delayed many days as they arrange
transportation, time off work and save additional money for travel and lodging
costs.").
See infra notes 173-81 and accompanying text.
* David R. Baron, The Racially Disparate Impact of Restrictions on the Public
Funding of Abortion: An Analysis of Current Equal Protection Doctrine, 13 B.C.
THIRD WORLD J. 1, 7-8 n.22 (1993); see also Laurie Nsiah-Jefferson, Reproductive
Laws, Women of Color, and Low-Income Women, 11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 15
(1989).
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an abortion rate more than twice the rate for white women.65
Therefore, though women of color represent only a third of all
Medicaid recipients, they are disproportionately burdened by
the elimination of Medicaid funding for abortion.66 Women of
color are also more likely to die from illegal abortions, which
are often sought for financial reasons or because of the pover-
ty-induced delays mentioned above. 7 As a result of poor medi-
cal conditions or teenage pregnancy, women of color are also
more likely to need very late abortions," because they face
more of the hardships caused by a denial of federally funded
abortion services.
Ironically, the enormous personal and financial toll that
the Hyde Amendment takes on all low-income women does not
even reduce federal expenditures. Although "cost justifications
alone are not, and should not be, a main factor in the determi-
nation of whether to fund low-income women's abortions,' 9
the fact remains that the Hyde Amendment is not cost effi-
cient. It is estimated that for every dollar spent funding abor-
tion for low-income women the federal government would save
approximately four dollars within the following two years;
funds that it would be required to spend in prenatal care,
delivery and postnatal care for the mother, and newborn care,
neonatal intensive care and pediatric care for the child, not to
"s Abortion in the United States, supra note 37, at 1 (abortion rate among non-
white women is 57 per 1000, compared to an abortion rate of 21 per 1000 among
white women).
66 Ensuring Reproductive Freedom, supra note 18, at 12.
'T See supra notes 50-52, 57 and accompanying text; see also Ensuring Repro-
ductive Freedom, supra note 18, at 12.
Although funding was available for part of the period between 1975 and
1979, eighty-two percent of the women who died from illegal abortions
were African-American or Latina. Further, during the same period, all six
of the women who died from illegal abortions sought for financial reasons
were African-American or Latina.
Id.
68 .Often poverty itself causes severe health problems. One woman on medical
assistance who obtained an abortion... was suffering from malnutrition ... and
needed an abortion both to protect her own damaged health and because she could
not afford another child." Affidavit of Katherine R. Welsh, supra note 41, at 6; see
also Nsiah-Jefferson, supra note 64, at 18 ("Medical problems are also a factor in
late abortions, including very late abortions .... Given the nature of their health
problems, poor women and women of color are particularly vulnerable to such
developments.").
69 Ensuring Reproductive Freedom, supra note 18, at 13 n.43.
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mention savings in AFDC, food stamps and the Women, In-
fants, and Children ("WIC") program.7" While the denial of
such funding exacts a heavy toll on low-income women, and
also appears irrational and ineffective economically, the Court
has failed to remedy the situation and has permitted the ban
on abortion funding to continue.
II. A DENIAL OF MEDICAID FUNDING FOR ABORTION Is A
DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION
In 1980, in Harris v. McRae,7 the Supreme Court used a
traditional equal protection analysis to uphold the Hyde
Amendment." That version of the Hyde Amendment denied
Medicaid funding for abortion, except in cases where a
woman's life was endangered or the pregnancy was a result of
a reported rape or incest. As a result, Congress has been al-
lowed to renew a similar version of the Hyde Amendment
every year since its enactment.
In general, when the Supreme Court has considered the
issue of access to abortion it has largely ignored the practical
effects of these restrictions and has failed to offer genuine
equal protection guarantees to women. The Court has based its
decisions concerning reproductive rights on the doctrine of
privacy. Reproductive health rights, however, should be more
heavily scrutinized to ensure equal protection guarantees. 3
70 Cost Implications, supra note 8, at 4.
71 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
72 Id. at 299. Although the Constitution does not specify "equal protection"
guarantees, the Court has interpreted the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment to contain "liberty or equal protection guarantees." See, e.g., id. at 301; see
also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 681 n.5 ("While the Fifth Amendment
contains no equal protection clause, it does forbid discrimination that is 'so unjus-
tifiable as to be violative of due process.'") (quoting Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S.
163, 168 (1964), and citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641-42 (1969), and
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
7 The Court's approach to the abortion issue has consisted of an extension of
the fundamental right to privacy, established by Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), which allowed married couples access to contraceptives. The doctrine of
privacy provided the basis for the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), but "has proven less-powerful than first appearances suggested." Anita L.
Allen, Autonomy's Magic Wand: Abortion and Constitutional Interpretation, 72 B.U.
L. REV. 683, 690 (1992). Legal challenges to abortion rights have questioned
whether the right to privacy itself is constitutional and argued that even if such a
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The Court in Harris failed to properly scrutinize the legislation
by refusing to adequately use equal protection doctrine to pro-
tect women's rights.
The Supreme Court's equal protection analysis mistakenly
insists upon applying an intermediate level of scrutiny to all
gender classifications.7 4 The Court should apply a modified
version of the equal protection doctrine to scrutinize more
closely legislation that negatively affects women as a
class-particularly in the area of reproductive health laws. The
modified equal protection analysis discussed below could ap-
propriately be applied to the question of abortion funding since
these restrictions affect all women, and only women, as a
class.75
privacy right exists, abortion rights are not among them. Id. at 691; see also Roe,
410 U.S. at 171 (Rehnquist, J., dissent); Thornburgh v. American Coll. of Obstetri-
cians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 785 (1986) (White, J., dissenting).
Although the Court created the foundation for abortion rights under the doc-
trine of privacy, there has been considerable criticism of this formulation. See, e.g.,
Ruth Colker, An Equal Protection Analysis of United States Reproductive Health
Policy: Gender, Race, Age, and Class, 1991 DUKE L.J. 324, 356 ("Many feminists
criticized the Court's privacy approach, because it could not protect the most dis-
advantaged women from coercive anti-abortion regulations."); Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L.
REV. 375, 386 (1985) ("Overall, the Court's Roe position is weakened, I believe, by
the opinion's concentration on a medically approved autonomy idea, to the exclu-
sion of a constitutionally based sex-equality perspective."); Sylvia A. Law, Rethink-
ing Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 1020 (1984) ("The rhetoric
of privacy, as opposed to equality, blunts our ability to focus on the fact that it is
women who are oppressed when abortion is denied. . . . The rhetoric of privacy
also reinforces a public/private dichotomy that is at the heart of the structures
that perpetuate the powerlessness of women."); Catherine A. MacKinnon, Reflec-
tions on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1311 (1991) ("The problem
is that while the private has been a refuge for some, it has been a hellhole for
others, often at the same time. In gendered light, the law's privacy is a sphere of
sanctified isolation, impunity, and unaccountability.").
Much of the criticism of abortion rights decisions has proposed equal protec-
tion justifications for abortion generally, and not for funding of abortion. Most
commentators who have argued specifically for abortion funding under an equal
protection rubric have focused on wealth as a suspect class. This Article uses the
funding issue to form a basis for the equal protection of abortion rights.
"' See infra notes 76-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of the levels of
scrutiny that the Court employs.
" Although the availability of abortion affects men in that it may influence
their sexual behavior or life choices, the biological reality is that women are the
ones who become pregnant. Although a man may feel a moral obligation to a
sexual partner who becomes pregnant, a man can choose to literally walk away
from an unintended pregnancy, while a woman faces the physical and psychologi-
cal effects of pregnancy. The Supreme Court, perhaps recognizing this reality, has
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This modified analysis acknowledges that women are a
suspect class. Traditional equal protection analysis emphasizes
the intent of the legislation more than its practical impact. In
contrast, a revised equal protection analysis focuses on the
practical effects of such legislation and concludes that bans on
abortion funding are violative of equal protection guarantees.
If the equal protection guarantee is going to offer any legiti-
mate protection to women, the doctrine must be changed to
reflect the realities of gender discrimination.
A. Traditional Equal Protection Doctrine
The traditional equal protection doctrine guarantees that
the government will treat all similar individuals in a similar
fashion."6 Although the government may classify individuals
or "draw lines" when creating and implementing certain laws,
such groupings cannot be arbitrary or based upon impermissi-
ble criteria." Once the court determines that a classification
has been made, it applies one of three "tiers," or levels of scru-
tiny to test whether the classification is proper. These levels of
scrutiny are: the rational relation standard, under which the
legislative means must be rationally related to the legislative
goal; intermediate or heightened scrutiny, under which the
government must show that the legislation is closely related to
an important objective; and, strict scrutiny, where the govern-
ment must show a compelling reason for the legislative classi-
fication.
The Court's use of three different levels of scrutiny demon-
strates that equal protection guarantees do not forbid classifi-
cations of every kind. The purpose of the equal protection anal-
ysis is to "measure the basic validity of the legislative classi-
fication.""8 Some classifications-such as, race, national origin
consistently struck down legislation that created a legal role for a man in a
woman's abortion decision. See e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsyl-
vania v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992); Law, supra note 73, at 1016 ("Abortion
laws present no analytic difficulty for determining whether the classification is
based on biological differences.").
76 JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 525 (1991).
"' Id. "The equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment does not
take from the States all power of classification." Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271 (1978) (citing Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976)).
"' Personnel Adm'r, 442 U.S. at 272 (upholding a state law which gave pref-
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or alienage-will require extraordinary justification for the
legislation and the Court will strike any legislation created
with the purpose of discriminating against such a suspect
class.79 But when a non-suspect classification is reasonably
based, the court will not be concerned if a law unevenly affects
a particular group.
The Court decides which level of scrutiny it will apply
based upon either the status of the group that the legislation
classifies or the right it affects. The Supreme Court has held
that only the groupings or classifications that are "inherently
suspect," specifically those based upon race," alienage," or
national origin, are entitled to strict scrutiny. 2 Legislation
that classifies individuals by race, alienage or national origin
will be subject to the highest level of scrutiny; that is, the
Court will be most skeptical of whether laws in this category
satisfy equal protection guarantees. 3
erence to veterans-the vast majority of whom were male-for state civil service
positions, even though the preference disadvantaged women).
"' "A racial classification, regardless of purported motivation, is presumptively
invalid and can be upheld only upon an extraordinary justification." Id. (citing
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184 (1964)).
8 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (citing Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964); Bolling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954)). The Court has at times extended strict scru-
tiny to classifications by alienage that treat resident aliens worse than U.S. citi-
zens, but "the test does not seem to be enforced quite as strictly in terms of the
review of these classifications." NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 76, at 531.
81 NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 76, at 531 (citing Graham v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971)).
82 Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 683 n.9 (citing Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633,
644-46 (1948); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Hirabayashi
v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)).
83 Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 682. ('[C]lassifications based upon race, alienage, and
national origin, are inherently suspect and must therefore be subjected to close
judicial scrutiny.").
Additionally, the Court will apply strict scrutiny if the legislation affects a
"fundamental right." According to the Court, "if a law 'impinges upon a fundamen-
tal right explicitly or implicitly secured by the Constitution [it] is presumptively
unconstitutional.'" Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 312. Rights are identified as
'fundamental" based on a substantive decision by the Court, generally unrelated to
equal protection or technical standards of review. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note
76, at 532.
This Article will focus on equal protection guarantees for abortion funding
using a "suspect class" argument rather than a fundamental rights argument.
Following Roe, the Court appeared close to calling abortion a fundamental right.
In a series of decisions, the Court has moved away from its strong support of
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When applying the strict scrutiny test, the Court requires
the government to show that its challenged legislation is nar-
rowly tailored to a "compelling" or "overriding" end that justi-
fies treatment of the protected individuals as a class.' In
practice, when the Court employs strict scrutiny the legislation
has fairly little chance of surviving."M By contrast, when the
Court employs the '"lowest tier' of scrutiny"5 -- the rational
relation test-it will not invalidate a law unless it is "'patently
arbitrary' and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate
governmental interest."" Thus, if the Court applies a rational
relation test, there is little chance it will invalidate the legisla-
tion.
When scrutinizing classification by gender, the Court has
wavered but ultimately has resisted treating gender as a sus-
pect class. The Court has designed a standard of review of
gender classifications that falls between the strict scrutiny and
rational relation standards of review. This "intermediate" stan-
dard of review of gender classifications requires the govern-
ment to show "at least that the classification serves 'important
governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means
employed' are 'substantially related to the achievement of
those objectives."'"M This intermediate standard of scrutiny is
abortion rights and allowed several, fairly strong restrictions on access to abortion.
Whether there exists a fundamental right to abortion remains debatable. See,
e.g., Barbara J. Cox, Refocusing Abortion Jurisprudence to Include the Woman: A
Response to Bopp and Coleson and Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 1990
Utah L. Rev. 543; Elizabeth A. Schneider, Workability of the Undue Burden Test,
66 TEMP. L. REv. 1003 (1993); Laurence H. Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conun-
drum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99
HARv. L. REV. 330 (1985).
" [Appellees were exercising a constitutional right, and any classification
which serves to penalize the exercise of that right, unless shown to be necessary
to promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional.'" San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 31 (1973) (quoting and reaffirming
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969)).
' "When expressed as a standard for judicial review, strict scrutiny is strict in
theory and usually fatal in fact." Larry P. Boyd, The Hyde Amendment: New Im-
plications for Equal Protection Claims, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 295, 297 n.14 (1981)
(citing Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, Foreword: "In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L.
REv. 1, 118 (1972)).
" Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 742 (1982) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 683.
Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724 (citing Wegler v. Druggist Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S.
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a non-solution. Intermediate scrutiny has not provided a clear
and consistent standard and has failed to adequately protect
women from gender discrimination. 9
Under the Court's analysis, legislation may violate equal
protection guarantees even if discriminatory classifications are
not apparent on the face of the legislation. If the legislation
does not explicitly classify individuals in a discriminatory man-
ner, the Court attempts to discern whether the intent in imple-
menting the legislation was to discriminate. Specifically, when
a law is facially neutral-showing no suspect classification in
its plain language-it violates equal protection guarantees only
if it was enacted for a discriminatory purpose or is applied in a
discriminatory manner.90 In contrast, when legislation does
plainly create a suspect classification, then proof of a disparate
impact is not necessary and the Court merely determines
whether the legislative classification, is appropriate.91 Since
legislatures rarely, if ever, disclose an intent to classify in a
suspect manner, under current equal protection doctrine it is
far easier to challenge facially neutral legislation by demon-
strating discriminatory administration of the law than to prove
a legislative intent to discriminate.92
B. Applying Strict Scrutiny to Gender Classifications
If the Court is to provide legitimate equal protection for
women through the current "tiered" system, it must acknowl-
142, 150 (1980)).
" The intermediate level of scrutiny has been criticized for its failure to pro-
vide for a clear standard to ensure women's equality. See, e.g. George C. Hlavac,
Interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause: A Constitutional Shell Game, 61
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1349 (1991); Hope E. Matchan & Katheryn E. Sheffield, Add-
ing Constitutional Depravation to Untimely Death: South Dakota's Living Will Preg-
nancy Provision, 37 S.D. L. REV. 388 (1992); William R. Engles, Comment, The
'Substantial Relation' Question in Gender Discrimination Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
149 (1985);.
"o See Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (impact of
pregnancy discrimination legislation provides an "important starting point" for
determining whether a gender-neutral statute effects women disproportionately);
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1976) (up-
holding a facially neutral zoning board decision that perpetuated racial segregation
in housing, despite the discriminatory effect).
" NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 76, at 543.
'2 NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 76, at 544.
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edge first that gender is a suspect classification and second,
that reproductive health legislation affects women as a class.
The Court should recognize gender classifications as suspect
because of a history of disparate legal treatment of women.
"Suspect class" status is granted to groups that are considered
part of a "discrete and insular" minority.93 The Court has al-
lowed only race, national origin and alienage into this protect-
ed category,94 and has denied that women as a class share the
characteristics of these minority groups; characteristics that
would entitle them to additional legal protection.95
Historically, women of all races have been in an inferior
position to men socially, economically and legally. In the area
of employment, women continue to earn less than men for
comparable or identical work.96 Women also face many forms
of discrimination in the workplace, including sexual harass-
ment, limited opportunities for advancement to upper-level
positions, pregnancy discrimination, and assumptions about
women with children. Although women have gained access to
the workplace and other traditionally male institutions, they
are still forced to conform with the "male" prototypes, while
simultaneously maintaining responsibility for the "female"
realm of home and family.97 This economic discrimination has
denied women the opportunity to become economically self-
sufficient, thereby contributing to the "feminization of poverty"
in the United States.98
' United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
" See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
" "The analogies between race- and sex-based discrimination are powerful.
Blacks and women share a similar history of oppression; prior to the Civil War
the laws defining the status of blacks and women borrowed freely from one anoth-
er." Law, supra note 73, at 963.
96 See, e.g., Teresa Amott & Julie Matthaei, Comparable Worth, Incomparable
Pay, in FOR CRYING OUT LOUD: WOMEN AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 316
(Rochelle Lefkowitz & Ann Withorn eds., 1986) ("Women cannot lift themselves out
of poverty by working because most women work in underpaid women's jobs.").
" "Exercise of significant ambition today demands a single-minded, egotistic
devotion that is inconsistent with primary responsibility for the care of children."
Law, supra note 73, at 965 n.29; see also MONA HARRINGTON, WOMEN LAWYERS
REWRITING THE RULES (1993). "By challenging notions of equality, for example,
women sought to enter the world of public citizenship. But the persistence of sepa-
rate spheres of work and family divided along gender-based lines, and the tenacity
of female responsibility for child rearing emerged as limitations to that world."
Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives From the
Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 650 (1986).
"' See SIDEL, supra note 2, at 14-26; FOR CRYING OUT LOUD, supra note 96 at
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Women have historically been denied full protection by the
legislative and legal systems. Until fairly recently many crimes
against women-including raping or assaulting one's
wife-were sanctioned by the legal system or were considered
"private" or "domestic" issues in which the legal system would
not interfere.99 Women continue to exercise limited political
power-despite such proclamations as "the Year of the Wom-
an" during the 1992 elections.0 0 Women of color have faced
additional barriers to equality and, in many ways, these addi-
tional concerns have been overlooked even by the feminist
movement.10 ' Although gender discrimination has been well-
documented by the women's movement, the courts and legisla-
16.
,9 See ESTRICH, supra note 23, at 23-24; LINDA FAIRSTEIN, SEXUAL VIOLENCE
(1993).
" "We remember when 1972 was the year of the woman: Shirley Chisholm ran
for President, Cissy Farenthold came in second for Vice President ... Then of
course 1984 was the year of the woman when Geraldine Ferraro got on the ticket.
And so were 1988 and 1990 .... well, you get the idea. Change has been some-
where between glacial and gradual." ELLEN GOODMAN, VALUE JUDGMENTS 232-33
(1993). An example of women's political powerlessness, despite electoral gains in
the 1992 elections, can be seen in the 1993 Congressional debates over renewal of
the Hyde Amendment.
During debate, opponents of the Hyde Amendment discussed the negative
impact of this legislation that would be borne by low-income women. The 1993
debate over the Hyde Amendment was more extensive than it had been since the
initial enactment of the legislation in 1977. Abortion rights advocates had hoped
that recent changes in the composition of the House and Senate, as well as a pro-
choice president, would result in defeat of the Hyde Amendment. See, e.g., Plan-
ning for the Abortion Debates, supra note 32, at A20; Schneider, supra note 32, at
Al; Tumulty, supra note 32, at Al. After a debate "punctuated by angry shouts
and tears," Anna Puga, U.S. House Keeps Ban on Funding for Abortion, BOST.
GLOBE, July 1, 1993, at 1, the House passed a version of the Hyde Amendment
which denied funding for abortion, except in cases of rape or incest, or if the
woman's life was endangered by the pregnancy. Hyde Amendment, supra note 3.
During debate over the Hyde Amendment, members of both the House and
Senate recognized that the restriction on funding was tantamount to a total denial
of access to abortion for low-income women. Five female Democratic members of
the Senate declared that passage of the Hyde Amendment would implement a two-
tiered system of abortion funding and, as Senator Carol Moseley-Braun stated,
that Congress "must separate reality from fiction (and decide) whether having
wealth gives some women more rights than others." Eric Pianin, Senate Keeps
Medicaid Abortion Limits, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 1993, at All. Ultimately, the
efforts of these newly elected Congresswomen were unsuccessful as the Hyde
Amendment was renewed, although in a modified version which provided funding
for pregnancies resulting from rape or incest.
... For a critical analysis of the historical treatment of women of color by the
feminist movement, see ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE AND CLASS (1983).
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tures historically have resisted legal remedies, requiring hard-
fought battles for even incremental changes." 2
In its 1973 decision, Frontiero v. Richardson,' the Su-
preme Court correctly recognized the practical reality of
women's "minority" status: "It is true, of course, that when
viewed in the abstract, women do not constitute a small and
powerless minority. Nevertheless, in part because of past dis-
crimination, women are vastly under-represented in this
Nation's decisionmaking councils.""0 4 The Fronteiro Court
noted that gender, like race and national origin, is "an immu-
table characteristic determined solely by the accident of
birth,"'0 5 and as a result, designated women a suspect class.
The plurality's reasoning in Frontiero clearly conveys that
a strict scrutiny standard for gender classifications is not only
possible, but is logical and desirable. Discrimination because of
a person's gender, the Court noted, would violate "the basic
concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some re-
lationship to individual responsibility."'6 Because the Court
found that characterizations by gender "frequently bear[ I no
relation to ability to perform or contribute to society,"10 7 it
concluded that classifications based upon gender, like "classifi-
cations based upon race, alienage, or national origin, are inher-
ently suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial
scrutiny."10
8
Yet, three years after it annunciated this standard, the
Court reverted to an intermediate scrutiny test for gender
classifications and, since that time, has adhered to this inter-
-2 See, e.g., KATHARINE T. BARTLETt, GENDER AND LAW (1993). For a detailed
analysis of the resistance to the passage of the Equal Rights Amendment, see
JANE J. MANDSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA (1986).
103 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
* Id. at 686 n.17. The Court stated that: "There has never been a female
President, nor a female member of this Court. Not a single woman presently sits
in the United States Senate, and only 14 women hold seats in the House of Rep-
resentatives." Id. Fortunately the political representation of women has increased
since this statement was made. In 1993, there were 47 women in the House, sev-
en women in the Senate, and two women on the Supreme Court. Despite these
advances, however, it is unlikely that women will overcome their minority status
in the immediate future, particularly in the political arena.
10 Id.
10 Id. at 686.
107 Id.
10- Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 688.
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mediate, and mediocre, level of equal protection for women." 9
The Court has not only failed to classify gender characteriza-
tions as suspect, but also has denied that legislation concern-
ing pregnancy and abortion affects women as a class.11°
Worse yet, in a number of decisions since it retreated from
applying strict scrutiny, the Court has used biological differ-
ences as a rationale for employing an intermediate level of
scrutiny."' In doing so, the Court often has failed to distin-
..9 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (intermediate level of scrutiny ap-
plied to challenge of Oklahoma statute that forbid sale of beverages containing
more than 3.2% alcohol to males under the age of 20 and to females under the
age of 18). The Court's departure from the strict scrutiny standard was short-lived,
as the Court later admitted: "As is evident from our opinions, the Court has had
some difficulty in agreeing upon the proper approach and analysis in cases involv-
ing challenges to gender-based classifications." Michael M. v. Superior Ct. of
Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 468 (1981). One year later, Justice Powell felt con-
fident enough about a lower-level scrutiny as the standard for gender classifica-
tions that he commented: "Even the Court does not argue that the appropriate
standard here is 'strict scrutiny'-a standard that none of our 'sex discrimination'
cases ever has adopted." Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 741
n.9 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting).
110 See, e.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
. See Michael M., 450 U.S. at 469 (upholding a discriminatory statutory rape
law and recognizing "realistically . . . the fact that the sexes are not similarly
situated"); Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 494 (failing to recognize pregnancy as a gender-
related condition and upholding regulations discriminating against pregnant wom-
en); see also infra notes 113-18 and accompanying text.
The Geduldig court acknowledged that only women can become pregnant but
stated that "it does not follow that every legislative classification concerning preg-
nancy is a sex-based classification." 417 U.S. at 496 n.20. To deny that such legis-
lation does not create a class of women, however, is an "Alice-in-Wonderland view
of pregnancy as a sex-neutral phenomenon." Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme
Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment,
91 HARV. L. REV. 45, 54 n.304 (1977).
The Court is not immune to social change. Not surprisingly, the addition of
Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sandra Day O'Connor has added to the change in tone
and content of debate on such issues. The Court has been extensively criticized for
its decision in Geduldig. It is doubtful that the Court would decide a similar case
in the same manner today. "Criticizing Geduldig has become a cottage industry.
Over two dozen law review articles have condemned both the Court's approach
and the result." Law, supra note 73, at 983 n.107. The Court does not cite
Geduldig often, and then only for limited propositions. Id. at 984 n.110.
In response to feminist arguments against the Court's decision, Congress
passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988),
which required that pregnancy, childbirth and related medical conditions be treat-
ed the same as any other medical disability. See Law, supra note 73, at 984 n.112
("After the Court extended the 'logic' of Geduldig to Title VII, Congress reacted
swiftly to provide . . . the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) of 1978.'); Schnei-
der, supra note 97, at 641 ("Even though the efforts of feminist litigators to treat
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guish between genuine biological differences and biological
rationales constructed to justify social stereotypes that oppress
women.1
2
Indeed, the Court generally has recognized biological dif-
ferences only to the detriment of women. For example, in
Geduldig v. Aiello,"' a pregnancy discrimination case, the
Court rejected the notion of pregnancy as a gender-related
condition and ruled that regulations affecting pregnant women
did not affect women as a class. Seven years later, however, in
In re Michael M.,"' the Court recognized the biological differ-
ences between men and women in order to justify upholding a
discriminatory statutory rape law. The law allowed men to
consent to sexual intercourse at a younger age than women.
The Court acknowledged that women are affected by pregnan-
cy in ways men are not."5 This selective acknowledgment of
biological differences to achieve results which perpetuate gen-
der stereotypes demonstrates the need for strict scrutiny.
Particularly in the area of biological differences, it is im-
portant for the Court to recognize women's "minority" status
and the need for a higher level of scrutiny to guarantee equal
protection to women."6 The Court must fully acknowledge
pregnancy as an equality issue failed in the courts, the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act was passed as a result of efforts based on feminist legal argumentation to fit
pregnancy into a discrimination model."). The Court has been considerably slower
than members of Congress to recognize that pregnancy is irrefutably related to
gender.
' Although genuine biological differences may warrant some disparate treat-
ment, permitting laws based on social stereotypes of women merely serves to rein-
force male dominance in society. See generally Law, supra note 73; MacKinnon,
supra note 73.
113 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
.14 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
n. The statutory rape law at issue in Michael M. applied a double standard by
which teenage males under age 18 were considered mature enough to consent to
sexual activity while females of the same ages were deemed incapable of giving
consent. In Michael M., the Court recognized that "[o]nly women may become
pregnant," id. at 471, and that "she alone endures the medical risks of pregnancy
or abortion. She suffers disproportionately the social, educational, and emotional
consequences of pregnancy." Id. at 479. The Court was willing to acknowledge that
pregnancy is a gender-specific condition in order to uphold a discriminatory statute
based on stereotypes of women as sexual victims. The Court subsequently has
resisted extending recognition of biological differences to regulations affecting preg-
nancy, contraception and abortion.
6 Women are at a particular disadvantage when laws discriminating on the
basis of biological differences are upheld. The Court should be especially wary of
1994]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
that only women become pregnant and that women bear a
disproportionate burden in childbearing."7 Therefore, the
Court must recognize that regulation of reproductive health
affects all women as a class, regardless of whether they are
seeking abortion services or abortion funding."'
A denial of access to abortion services for any woman
serves to perpetuate gender stereotypes of women as "breed-
ers" whose primary function is to bear and rear children. Such
gender stereotypes, perpetuated by legislation regulating abor-
the impact of such laws. As Professor Sylvia Law states:
[Blecause there are no escapees from biology, no pregnant men, or wom-
en sperm donors, a standard focusing solely on comparative equality does
not provide a helpful tool for evaluating laws governing ways in which
men and women categorically, biologically differ.... An equality doctrine
that ignores the unique quality of these experiences implicitly says that
women can claim equality only insofar as they are like men."
Law, supra note 73, at 1004-07.
117 "Laws restricting abortion so dramatically shape the lives of women, and
only of women, that their denial of equality hardly needs a detailed elaboration.
While men retain the right to sexual and reproductive autonomy, restrictions on
abortion deny that autonomy to women." TRIBE, supra note 58, at 105. "No men
are damaged in the way women are harmed by an abortion prohibition ....
[Abortion] is, in essence, a female procedure, a procedure only women need," and
abortion restrictions are created "with the clear aim of keeping women and only
women from access to it." MacKinnon, supra note 73, at 1321-22.
Women may also bear a disproportionate responsibility in childrearing, but
such differences are generally socially constructed and are not based on immutable
characteristics as is the case with childbearing. Since this cultural norm has been
changing, with women now composing 45% of the employed workforce, BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WORKING WOMEN: A CHARTBOOK 2 (Aug.
1991), and 55% of women with children under age three are working, there has
been some redistribution in child care responsibilities. Id. at 7. These changes are
reflected in legislative initiatives, such as the Family and Medical Leave Act of
1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 29 C.F.R. § 825 (1993). Because of the biological reality
that women bear children, an equal protection argument can be firmly based upon
biological differences, although an equivalent argument could be made based upon
a cultural history of women's oppression.
8 "Because such laws [restricting abortion] deprive women of means to deter-
mine whether or not they will become mothers should they become pregnant, they
impair the possibility of sexual pleasure for women, and aggravate the force of
sexual fear." Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on
Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 371
(1992).
Furthermore, the group of women who are Medicaid-eligible is not a closed
group but is open to any woman who falls into poverty. Just as almost any wom-
an can become pregnant unexpectedly, so can almost any woman unexpectedly
become reliant on Medicaid. As discussed earlier, the denial of Medicaid funding is
equivalent to a total denial of abortion services for many low-income women. See
supra notes 32-46 and accompanying text.
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tion, negatively affect all women regardless of income level or
whether they are capable of conceiving children."9 Restric-
tions on access to abortion limit women's ability to control both
their biological condition and their position in society.20
Women as a class have been excluded from the workforce be-
cause of their very capacity to become pregnant, irrespective of
whether an individual woman intends to become pregnant. 2'
The very possibility of becoming unexpectedly pregnant affects
women's capacity to enjoy sexuality and threatens their
health 22 and their ability to participate equally in all aspects
of life.
Specific regulations and restrictions on abortion reinforce
certain gender-based stereotypes. For instance, requiring a
twenty-four hour waiting period before a woman can obtain an
abortion implies that women as a group are incapable of inde-
pendently making a decision without being told to "go home
and sleep on it." Requiring a woman to consult with, and often
219 "Whether or not women have children, they are disadvantaged by social
norms that limit their options because of women's enforced role in childbearing
and childrearing." MacKinnon, supra note 73, at 1312.
Gender stereotypes of women as childbearers and childrearers have effectively
enforced the notion of women as second-class citizens. The separation of the public
and private spheres has served to reinforce gender roles as:
Production (or much of it anyway) is a social activity under the control
of capital, socially valued and distributed through the price of its prod-
ucts and for which workers are paid a wage. Reproduction (in the sense
of having babies) is a private activity with no direct control by capital,
no social mechanism for its recognition and co-ordination, and for which
no recompense is paid to women.
Susan Himmelweit, Abortion: Individual Choice and Social Control, in SEXUALITY:
A READER 98, 99 (Feminist Review ed., 1987).
12 These social and biological dimensions to women's control over their repro-
ductive health have been described as the two essential ideas underlying the femi-
nist view of reproductive rights. The first is "an extension of the general principle
of 'bodily self-determination,' to the notion that women must be able to control
their bodies and procreative capacities." PETCHESKY, supra note 2, at 2. The sec-
ond is a "'historical and moral argument' based on the social position of women
and the needs that such a position generates." Id.
121 "[Cloncern for a woman's existing or potential offspring historically has been
the excuse for denying women equal-employment opportunities." International Un-
ion v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 211 (1991) (a manufacturer may not
exclude fertile women from certain jobs because of its concern for the health of
the fetus a woman might conceive.).
122 PETCHESKY, supra note 2, at 5. For example, the widespread use and accep-
tance of contraceptives that endanger women's lives have included the Dalkon
Shield, the "Pill" and Depo-Provera.
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to obtain the permission of her husband before obtaining an
abortion-so-called "spousal notification" laws-implies that
women and the fetuses they carry are the property of their
husbands since actions affecting either must be subject to his
notice and, implicitly, his approval. Such laws also ignore the
reality of abusive marriages, often with extremely damaging
consequences for women. Similarly, parental notification or
parental consent laws, even those which include a judicial-
bypass option, are based on the myth of the "Father-Knows-
Best" model of parenting and often ignore the reality of absent
or abusive parents, and an insensitive and patriarchial judicia-
ry.
Until legislation based on gender stereotypes is eradicated,
even women who are not directly subject to immediate regula-
tion will feel its effects. Although the Court at one time consid-
ered gender classifications suspect,12 it has shown a greater
reluctance to recognize the social implications of abortion re-
strictions and their discriminatory purpose. Once the Court
acknowledges that gender classifications should be granted
suspect-class status, it must examine more carefully such clas-
sifications to determine if the purpose of the legislation is to
discriminate against women.
C. Application of a Revised Purposeful Requirement
Under a traditional equal protection model, a challenge to
the ban on federal funding of abortion faces two doctrinal ob-
stacles. These obstacles are a result of earlier Supreme Court
decisions that tolerated sex discrimination. First, as discussed
earlier, the Court has rejected the notion that pregnancy is a
sex-based characteristic; 24 and, second, the required showing
of a discriminatory legislative intent is extremely difficult to
surmount.'25
123 See supra notes 104-09 and accompanying text.
124 See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
125 Ruth Colker, defines these obstacles well, stating:
There are two major doctrinal difficulties in trying to apply current equal
protection doctrine to reproductive health issues: (1) the Geduldig v.
Aiello holding -that pregnancy is not a sex-based condition, and (2) the
Personnel Administrator v. Feeney holding that purposeful discrimination
must be established by proving that a legislature acted "because of its
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Equal protection standards should concentrate on the
situation of those who are discriminated against, rather than
reviewing the intentions of the discriminator. A more practical
purposeful requirement would focus on the impact of the legis-
lation at issue, not on congressional intent. A revised analysis
simply would ask whether the state's interest in protecting the
fetus is being promoted in a manner that directly harms the
welfare of women as a class. The court could therefore "exam-
ine what the state is doing to women, and not simply why it
does it."'26 Currently, the Court refuses to acknowledge that
legislation restricting access to abortion affects women as a
class, and therefore is not facially neutral and not subject to a
showing of purposefulness. Consequently, the requirement that
a purposeful intent to discriminate must be shown for a "facial-
ly neutral" statute should be revised to reflect the reality of the
subtle sexism in the law.
The characteristics of abortion legislation demonstrate the
need and opportunity for a revised form of equal protection
analysis. The Hyde Amendment on its face applies only to that
group of individuals who can become pregnant: women.'27 To
illustrate this point, suppose that the legislature declared that
anyone who developed testicular cancer would not be covered
by Medicaid for particular treatments-those disapproved by
the legislature. The denial of cancer treatment funding would
not immediately impact all men, only those with cancer, or
with the possibility of developing cancer. Certainly some men
could minimize their chances of developing cancer through a
healthy lifestyle and good luck. But since there is no totally
reliable method for either staying healthy enough to avoid
cancer or wealthy enough to avoid the need for Medicaid fund-
ing, this legislation would impact all men as a group. There-
fore, this legislation would not be gender neutral on its face.
desire to harm women rather than "in spite of' this desire.
Colker, supra note 73, at 357.
16 Siegel, supra note 118, at 369 (emphasis added). Fears that such a standard
would open a floodgate of overturned legislation could be addressed by a "con-
strained application of antisubordination principles" which would be reserved for
groups that historically have faced discrimination. Id. at 368.
12 See supra notes 113-126 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Court's recognition of biological differences. Even though the Court has so far
rejected pregnancy as a sex-based characteristic, the Hyde Amendment's discrimi-
nation against women is clear both on its face and in its application.
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The biological reality is that, for obvious reasons, only men can
develop cancer of the testes. Similarly, only women can become
pregnant.
Even if the Court insists that the fact that only women
become pregnant is insufficient to declare legislation facially
discriminatory, the Court cannot deny that in practice such
legislation primarily affects women. Without elaborate statisti-
cal surveying, it is obvious that 100% of the people directly
affected by the Hyde Amendment will be women because only
women have abortions. Although men may be affected second-
arily by the Hyde Amendment's denial of abortion funding, this
legislation is targeted solely at pregnant women.
Demonstrating that the legislation has a greater effect on
a certain group of people, however, is not considered conclusive
proof that the legislation violates traditional equal protection
guarantees. Although statistical evidence of the effects of legis-
lation may indicate discriminatory application of a law, the
Court will rarely consider such evidence alone to be absolute
proof of a violation of equal protection.12 Instead, the Court
has minimized the importance of the discriminatory impact of
pregnancy legislation. The Court has noted that when the dis-
criminatory impact is "essentially an unavoidable consequence
of a legislative policy that has in itself always been deemed to
be legitimate, and when.., the statutory history and all of the
available evidence affirmatively demonstrate the opposite, the
inference simply fails to ripen into proof."'129 Such an argu-
ment is completely circular. The Court is using an equal pro-
tection analysis to determine whether legislation serves a pur-
pose so legitimate that its discriminatory impact may be ig-
nored. Thus, the Court validates legislation by saying it has a
legitimate purpose when this is exactly what the Court is try-
ing to determine by its analysis.
The Court, however, does concede that in instances where
"the statistical proof is overwhelming, it may be sufficient to
establish a prima facie case.""' The effects of regulation of
12 NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 76, at 544 ("Throughout its decisions in
cases concerning the existence of classifications, the Court has held that statistical
proof is usually relevant but rarely determinative.").
12 Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 n.25 (1978).
129 NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 76, at 545; see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356 (1886) (striking a facially neutral law which prohibited operating a
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pregnancy and abortion are almost exclusively felt by women.
Thus, even if the Court denies that pregnancy and abortion are
themselves gender-related conditions, it cannot deny that the
primary effects of legislation regulating pregnancy are over-
whelmingly experienced by women.
Even if it acknowledges the discriminatory effects of chal-
lenged legislation, the Court may still require a showing of a
"discriminatory purpose."'' Yet, the traditional equal protec-
tion analysis of discriminatory purpose does not consider the
gender stereotypes that influence some Congressional decisions
denying abortion funding. The Court's distinction that legisla-
tion must be passed "because of' rather than "in spite of' a
discriminatory purpose is tenuous. 132 Determining congressio-
nal intent in reproductive health law is an arduous task, par-
ticularly since legislative history is largely indiscernible and
often contains, barely visible, but significant, gender stereo-
types about women and motherhood. The danger exists that
gender stereotypes are so ingrained that legislators do not
recognize that such assumptions form the basis of a policy. For
instance, a legislature may consider compelled pregnancy a
"reasonable" way to preserve fetal life but this belief may be
based on archaic or stereotypic assumptions about women and
pregnancy. 3' The traditional purposeful analysis is misguid-
ed in its heavy reliance on legislative intent, which may be
impossible to determine and once determined can contain sub-
tle gender stereotypes harmful to women.'34
laundry without a permit except in a brick or stone building when, in practice,
the state denied permits to all Chinese applicants).
131 "[Elven if a neutral law has a disproportionately adverse effect upon a racial
minority, it is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause only if that
impact can be traced to a discriminatory purpose." Personnel Adm'r, 442 U.S. at
272.
32 For a strong argument in favor of replacing the "perpetrator perspective"
with the doctrine of "antisubjugation" in equal protection doctrine, see Baron, su-
pra note 64, at 56-60. Baron makes a strong race-based argument against denial
of abortion funding. A considerable number of commentators addressing a revision
of equal protection analysis have advocated an "antisubordination principle." See,
e.g., LAURENCE TRIBE, AiERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988); Kenneth L. Karst,
Woman's Constitution, 1984 DUKE L.J. 447; Catherine A. MacKinnon, supra note
73; Siegel, supra note 118. This Note discusses those analyses which are more
directed towards reproductive health issues.
1" Siegel, supra note 118, at 363.
134 Yet even under the Court's own stringent purposefulness test, the Hyde
Amendment can be shown to have a discriminatory purpose. In addition to statis-
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In addition, legislation that restricts access to abortion is
unique in that it is directed at women as a class, has the dra-
matic effect of forced pregnancy, and historically has signifi-
cantly oppressed women. Although the inevitable outcome of
the Hyde Amendment is to restrict or deny abortion access for
women, the traditional equal protection analysis does not con-
sider this demonstrative of congressional intent. The Court has
rejected the inevitable outcome of legislation as conclusive
proof of intentional discrimination by Congress.135 It has re-
quired a showing that the legislative body has "selected or
reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'be-
cause of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an
tical evidence of the adverse effects of the Hyde Amendment, the legislative histo-
ry of the Hyde Amendment shows Congress's discriminatory purpose. The 1993
Congressional debate over the Hyde Amendment demonstrates that Congress in-
tended to discriminate against women by denying them access to reproductive
health care. Statements made during a heated and well-publicized congressional
debate underscore that Congress was well aware that the Hyde Amendment,
though neutral on its face, would impact women, not men. Opponents of the Hyde
Amendment argued that it discriminated on the basis of race and gender. House
members articulated that abortion funding is "an issue of discrimination and fair-
ness." Puga, supra note 100, at 1.
Not all members of Congress agreed on exactly how the legislation would
affect women. What is important to a showing of "purposefulness" is that members
of Congress acknowledged that the legislation would classify individuals. Even
Hyde Amendment supporters recognized that the legislation had disparately affect-
ed people according to their gender and race. Representative Henry Hyde claimed
that providing abortion funding would say to black women: "You can't have a job.
You can't have an education. You can't have a decent place to live, so here's what
we'll do: We'll give you a free abortion." Schneider, supra note 33, at Al. Repre-
sentative Hyde's comments imply that rather than provide low-income women with
more access to necessities, his solution would be to further deprive them of bene-
fits, such as reproductive health care.
Even if members of Congress failed to consciously recognize that this clas-
sification would negatively affect women, sexist attitudes nonetheless "play an im-
portant role in the enactment of abortion regulation." Siegel, supra note 118, at
362. A legislator's genuine concern for the welfare of the fetus often is based upon
archaic or stereotypical assumptions about women, which biases their deliberations
and prioritizes fetal life-saving even if it requires forced pregnancy. Id. The abor-
tion debate pits women's rights against fetal rights. Thus, because society is un-
able to engage in this moral debate with a full notion of women's equality it may
be unable to "'balance' the rights of women and the unborn as if it were a disin-
terested bystander to a conflict thrust upon women by nature." Id. at 379.
' "Certainly, when the adverse consequences of a law upon an identifiable
group are as inevitable as the gender-based consequences of [the law in question],
a strong inference that the adverse effects were desired can reasonably be drawn.
But in this inquiry-made as it is under the Constitution-an inference is a work-
ing tool, not a synonym for proof." Personnel Adm'rs, 442 U.S. 256, 279 n.25.
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identifiable group."" 6
Yet, if the purpose of equal protection is to guarantee
equal protection for all individuals, then the intent of those
legislators enacting the law should be less important than the
law's impact. Traditional equal protection doctrine focuses on
"the judgment and justifications of the state actors deploying
public power, rather than the impact of a particular exercise of
power on the citizens subject to it."'37 Because gender dis-
crimination often is very subtle, and may be based on a combi-
nation of biological facts and sexual stereotyping, searching for
"purposeful" discrimination frequently will be futile. 8 If
equal protection guarantees exist to facilitate a truly equal
society, then scrutiny must focus on the impact of laws that
oppress women.
A revised equal protection model, which considers gender
as a suspect class and de-emphasizes the discriminatory legis-
lative intent requirement, offers greater protection from legis-
lation that oppress women. The Court should concentrate not
on whether a legislative goal to classify by gender is substan-
tially related to important governmental ends, but instead
should ask: "Has the challenged action harmed women in ways
that enforce, perpetuate, or aggravate their subordinate social
status?"3 9 This revised analysis would focus on the practical
effects of the challenged legislation rather than the relatively
minor and uncertain question of whether legislators were
aware of these effects when they passed the legislation. Such a
standard would enable a more substantial challenge to gender
discrimination, while maintaining the substance of the tradi-
tional equal protection analysis.
Under traditional equal protection analysis, once the Court
determines that the legislation enforces harmful gender stereo-
types, the burden shifts to the state. The Court should develop
an equal protection standard under which a law could discrimi-
nate on the basis of gender only if a compelling state interest
... Id. at 297.
Siegel, supra note 118, at 368.
13" 'Classifications based upon gender, not unlike those based upon race, have
traditionally been the touchstone for pervasive and often subtle discrimination."
Personnel Adm'r, 442 U.S. at 273 (citing Caan v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 398
(Stewart, J., dissenting)); see also Law, supra note 73, at 973-87.
... Siegel, supra note 118, at 369 n.425.
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was shown. Such a standard would allow courts to require a
non-discriminatory alternative when a law negatively affected
women. Additionally, at the point of determining whether a
state interest was in fact compelling, the Court again would
consider the "broader substantive concerns of sex equality,
including the oppression of women and the constraints of tradi-
tional sex roles."14
Under this revised approach to equal protection, the Court
would be required to perform a more comprehensive analysis,
balancing the legislative goals against the burdens the law, in
practice, places on women as a class. A law would be upheld
only if it had "no significant impact in perpetuating either the
oppression of women or culturally imposed sex-role constraints
on individual freedom,"' or if the government had a compel-
ling interest in what the law sought to regulate. Such a stan-
dard of scrutiny for sex-based classifications places the burden
on the state to justify the law and ensures that important
governmental reasons exist to justify disparate treatment of
men and women.'42
D. Application of a New Model of Equal Protection Guarantees
The proposed revised standard would effectively strike
abortion restrictions such as the Hyde Amendment. Under this
standard, the Court would be required to reconsider whether
the state's interest in the fetus is compelling enough to encour-
age forced pregnancy through a denial of abortion funding.
Unlike the Court's deferential rational relation standard ap-
plied to the Hyde Amendment in Harris v. McRae,' a re-
vised standard of equal protection genuinely would consider
the gender inequality perpetuated by a denial of access to
abortion through funding bans. An application of the revised
standard to the facts in Harris demonstrates how this stan-
dard is useful for genuinely facilitating equal protection for
women.
In 1980, when abortion rights, as defined by Roe v.
14o Law, supra note 73, at 1011.
.. Law, supra note 73, at 1008-09.
"2 Law, supra note 73, at 1008.
'43 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
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Wade,'44 were at their strongest, the Supreme Court in Har-
ris upheld the Hyde Amendment and declared that the federal
government was not required to provide abortion funding. The
Court's analysis did not consider gender a suspect class. In-
stead, Harris applied a traditional equal protection analysis,
rejected the notion that the Hyde Amendment burdened a
"fundamental right" to abortion access,'45 and declined to con-
sider economic classifications suspect." 6 Accordingly, the
'" 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
'1 Harris, 448 U.S. at 312-18. "We address first the appellees argument that
the Hyde Amendment, by restricting the availability of certain medically necessary
abortion under Medicaid, impinges on the 'liberty' protected by the Due Process
Clause as recognized in Roe v. Wade . . . and its progeny." Id. at 312.
In holding that the legislation did not impinge upon a fundamental right to
abortion, the Court reasoned that although an indigent woman may have less
access to abortion, this was a result not of any government actions but of "her
own indigency." Id. at 316. The Court found that the Hyde Amendment gave an
indigent woman "at least the same range of choice" in deciding whether to obtain
an abortion as she would have if the government had chosen to not provide any
health care. Id. at 317. By calling a woman's restricted access to abortion a "prod-
uct . . . of her indigency," id at 316, the Court fell into using the old stereotype
of the "undeserving poor" who should be grateful to receive any health care at all.
The dominant ideology in the United States generally, and in the Court par-
ticularly, has been reluctance to acknowledge any entitlement to basic needs such
as food, clothing and shelter. The notion of individual rights has focused more on
entitlement to political rights, and the right to be free from government interfer-
ence, than entitlement to any basic necessities. See, e.g., Karst, supra note 111, at
62 (describing the need for an expanded principle of human rights and a "principle
of equal citizenship [which] ... call[s] for judicial intervention when economic
inequalities make it impossible for a person to have 'a fully human existence' and
the political branches of government turn a blind eye"). Popular support for a
national health care plan may indicate that entitlement to basic human needs is
becoming more accepted-perhaps as a result of larger segments of the population
being threatened with the loss of such basic necessities.
14 Harris, 448 U.S. at 323 ("[Tlhis Court has held repeatedly that poverty,
standing alone, is not a suspect classification."). The Court has consistently denied
that wealth is a suspect class. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1 (1973).
In addition to their equal protection claims, appellees challenged the constitu-
tionality of the Hyde Amendment based on the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment, which prohibits any "law respecting an establishment of religion," and
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, which provides the right to
freedom of religion. Harris, 448 U.S. at 311. The Court rejected the Establishment
Clause argument because it was "convinced that the fact that the funding re-
strictions in the Hyde Amendment may coincide with the religious tenets of the
Roman Catholic Church does not, without more, contravene the Establishment
Clause." Id. at 319-20. The Court dismissed a Free Exercise Clause argument be-
cause it ruled that appellees lacked proper standing to raise such a challenge. Id.
at 320.
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Court upheld the Hyde Amendment on the ground that the
legislation's means were "rationally related" to its purported
goal.147
147 Whenever it is applied to abortion restrictions, the rational relation standard
has failed to protect women because it does not require a compelling reason for
legislation that negatively affects women as a group. The Court's decision in Har-
ris, finding that abortion funding was rationally related to the legislative goal of
protecting the fetus, was far too deferential to the legislature.
The Court should use a higher level of scrutiny when considering legislation
that affects women as dramatically as does a denial of abortion funding. Basing
equal protection on economic position results in a denial of rights to low-income
people. Low-income women should not be denied the equal protection benefits
available to wealthier women since such vital rights should not be "for sale." "The
denial to some women of the right to choose to terminate a pregnancy, while
others can exercise that right freely . . . seems particularly immoral when the line
between the two groups is based on something as unrelated to the situation of the
pregnancy or to any right of the unborn, and as frequently beyond a woman's
control, as personal wealth." TRIBE, supra note 60, at 207.
When low-income women are forced to bear unwanted children because they
lack abortion funding, their low-income status is perpetuated. The additional ex-
pense and responsibility of a child may make it impossible for a woman to raise
herself above the poverty level.
Additionally, the disparate racial and gender impact of the denial of abortion
funding calls for a greater justification of the legislation than the mere rational-
relation test. Justice Marshall found the rational-relation standard inappropriate
because the race, wealth and gender implications of the Hyde Amendment were in
opposition to equal protection guarantees:
The fact that the Hyde Amendment falls exclusively on financially desti-
tute women suggests "a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail
the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to
protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more search-
ing judicial inquiry."
Harris, 448 U.S. at 344 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938)).
The application of a strict scrutiny test for gender discrimination offers a
more appropriate standard for measuring the constitutionality of abortion re-
strictions. Unlike the rational relation test, strict scrutiny requires the government
to employ the least burdensome method of reaching its legitimate legislative goal.
The rational relation standard is more appropriately applied in cases concern-
ing economic rights. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117 (1978)
(upholding a state law regulating the pricing practices of petroleum producers and
refiners, and limiting their ownership of retail gas stations); Baldwin v. Fish &
Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978) (upholding a state law charging non-residents
more than state residents for hunting licenses).
Justice Marshall, in his Harris dissent, asserted that the rational-relation test
was unsuitable when applied to the issue of abortion funding. He stated: "I do not
believe that legislation that imposes a crushing burden on indigent women can be
treated with the same deference given to legislation distinguishing among business
interests." Harris, 448 U.S. at 342 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Many commentators
have argued that the rational relation test is inappropriate for legislation affecting
human rights. See, e.g., Roy G. Spece, Jr., A Purposive Analysis of Constitutional
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The first step in applying either the traditional or revised
equal protection analysis is to scrutinize the governmental
interest. The only governmental interest discussed in Harris
was a "legitimate interest in protecting the potential life of the
fetus." 48 But this interest was not legitimate. First, the
government's asserted interest in protecting the fetus was not
the true purpose of the legislation. Second, if the legislation
was designed to protect the "potential life of the fetus" this is
not a legitimate state interest-let alone a compelling
one-under the Court's established abortion-rights law. Final-
ly, even if the state does have a legitimate interest in protect-
ing a fetus, the denial of funding does not provide even a ratio-
nal means-and certainly not a narrowly tailored means-of
reaching this goal.
The Hyde Amendment's purported goal of protecting the
fetus is suspect. More likely, the goal of the Hyde Amendment
is simply to decrease the number of abortions indirectly by
denying funding to women who may have no alternative but to
carry a pregnancy to term.' Anti-abortion legislation has
been most successful when it has focused on low-income wom-
en whose financial pressures make them the most vulnerable
to restricted abortion access. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has
recognized that the "hostile reaction to Roe has trained largely
on" the low-income woman who "lacks resources to finance pri-
vately implementation of her personal choice to terminate her
pregnancy."50 For example, during the Reagan and Bush Ad-
ministrations, a range of funding restrictions deliberately as-
serted anti-abortion policies on domestic and international
recipients of reproductive health care funds.'5 ' Several of
Standards of Judicial Review and a Practical Assessment of the Constitutionality of
Regulating Recombinant DNA Research, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1281 (1978).
148 Harris, 448 U.S. at 324.
.. Henry Hyde himself, while debating the original enactment of the bill, ad-
mitted: "I certainly would like to prevent, if I could legally, anybody having an
abortion, a rich woman, a middle-class woman, or a poor woman. Unfortunately,
the only vehicle available is the . . . Medicaid bill." Baron, supra note 64, at 13
(citing 123 CONG. REC. H6083 (daily ed. June 17, 1977) (statement of Rep. Henry
J. Hyde)).
1' Bader Ginsburg, supra note 73, at 383.
... Domestic legislation denying abortion funding included: the "gag rule" pre-
venting federally funded family planning counselors from mentioning abortion as
an option, 42 C.F.R. § 59.8-59.10 (1992); appropriations for the District of Colum-
bia, Pub. L. No. 102-382, § 114 (1992); the Civilian Health and Medical Program
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these restrictions have since been repealed by the Clinton
Administration.15
Furthermore, even if the government's goal genuinely is to
protect fetal life, this is unconstitutional. Although the Court
has wavered in its support of abortion rights, at no point has
the Court proclaimed that the state has the kind of general
interest in the potential life of the fetus that the Harris majori-
ty relied on for finding a legitimate state interest."3 The gov-
ernment may not legitimately have an interest in a pre-viable
fetus.5
Finally, if the government's goal were deemed sufficiently
compelling, this goal could be achieved by methods far less
burdensome than forced pregnancy. Restrictions in funding are
of the Uniformed Services, which provides health care for military dependents and
retirees, 32 C.F.R. § 199.4(2) (1992); health care for federal prison inmates, 28
C.F.R. § 551.23(b) (1992); and for federal government employees, Pub. L. No. 102-
393 (1992). See Ensuring Reproductive Freedom, supra note 18, at 14-17.
International policies restricting abortion access focused on contraception pro-
grams, but also had an impact on a number of other policy areas not directly
related to women's reproductive health care. Id. at 42. These policies banned abor-
tion information, counseling and referral services for recipients grants from the
Agency for International Development-the "Mexico City" policy-and other agen-
cies, including the United Nations Fund for Population Activities, the Support for
Eastern European Democracy Program and Congressional Assistance to Romania,
and the Agriculture and Trade Development Assistance Act of 1954. Ensuring
Reproductive Freedom, supra note 18, at 46-61.
152 President Clinton repealed the Title X "gag rule," the "Mexico City Policy,"
the ban on abortions at military hospitals, lifted the moratorium on funding for
fetal tissue research, and ordered the import ban on RU486 to be reconsidered.
Ensuring Reproductive Freedom, supra note 18, at 1.
" Even if the government did have a legitimate interest in the fetus from the
moment of conception, protecting fetal rights by denying abortion funding and
coercing low-income women into carrying a pregnancy to term is an unusually
cruel way to reach this goal. As Justice Brennan recognized in Harris: "As a
means of preventing abortions, [the Hyde Amendment] is concededly ration-
al-brutally so." Harris, 448 U.S. at 330 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The rational relation standard is inappropriate when addressing issues that
are so coercive and so close to fundamental or constitutional rights. Abortion fund-
ing is the "one health care service absolutely required for the exercise of a
woman's decisional autonomy as protected by Roe." Robin M. Collin & Robert W.
Collin, Are the Poor Entitled to Privacy?, 8 HARV. BLACKLErER J. 181, n.125
(1991).
... In Roe v. Wade, the Court devised a trimester system which allowed the
state an interest in the potential life of the fetus only after the point of viability;
generally considered to be in the third trimester. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Although
the Court in Casey essentially abolished the trimester framework, the Court did
preserve its general guidelines by limiting the state's interest in early pregnancy.
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a cruel and inappropriate means of inflicting an anti-abortion
agenda on low-income women. If the government is genuinely
concerned about protecting the fetuses of low-income women, it
could do so through far more rational and humane legislation.
The government could protect unwanted fetuses by deterring
unplanned pregnancies or by concentrating its efforts on pro-
grams that foster the best pre-natal care. More positive mea-
sures to prevent unwanted pregnancies could include providing
low-cost or free contraceptives and sex education. This ap-
proach of "refocusing the [public health] system toward preven-
tion" has been advocated by members of the Clinton Adminis-
tration.155
In addition, the government should focus on methods of
decreasing the number of women who choose abortion out of
economic necessity. To discourage abortion without coercing
women to carry the pregnancy to term, the government must
address the underlying social inequalities which influence a
woman's decision not to carry her pregnancy to term. This
approach would involve addressing social factors that restrict a
woman's ability to support a child. For example, gender dis-
crimination accounts for unequal wages, yet with equal pay a
single woman might be able to afford to carry a pregnancy to
term and support a child from her salary alone. Social inade-
quacies, such as an absence of quality, affordable child care,
often force women to choose between earning an income and
having children.
The current abortion debate, which pits a woman against
her fetus, does not emphasize the need for a broad range of
policies to advance women's rights and to discourage unwanted
pregnancy. Advocates should concentrate on encouraging the
government to protect fetal life by developing policies that
recognize reproductive health care as part of a broader need
for women's equality.
... Surgeon General Joycelyn Elders, M.D., notes that preventative reproductive
health care measures are also economical: "for every $1 spent on prenatal care, at
least $3.38 is saved . . . [and) for every dollar spent on public family planning,
more than $4 in public funds for health and social services are saved." Joycelyn
Elders, The Future of Public Health, 269 JAMA 2293, 2293 (1993).
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E. The Supreme Court's Resistance to Expanding Equal
Protection Guarantees for Women
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has a long history of
failing to fully recognize women's rights, particularly in the
area of reproductive rights. One drawback to a revised equal
protection standard that relies on judicial discretion is that the
Court may fail to recognize when legislation perpetuates harm-
ful stereotypes about women. Although the Supreme Court has
made some progress in its understanding of the need for great-
er protection of women's rights in some areas of law-such as
in sexual harassment cases 5 -- the Court seems particularly
slow to ensure women's full reproductive rights.
Since Roe v. Wade, a series of Supreme Court decisions
have gradually restricted access to abortion by allowing the
state to have an interest in the pre-viable fetus. Two of the
Court's more recent decisions, Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services,5 ' and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsyl-
vania v. Casey,58 are most relevant to the abortion funding
issue and the debate over women's reproductive health care in
general. Although neither case directly addressed the issue of
federal abortion funding, both Webster and Casey further nar-
rowed abortion access for low-income women by upholding
abortion restrictions. 59  Both decisions demonstrate the
156 See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
157 492 U.S. 490 (1989). The Court has decided a number of other abortion
rights cases in this time period. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (invalidating state statutes
that required women to view anti-abortion literature and physicians to determine
fetal viability and to preserve the fetus in post-viability abortions); Akron v. Akron
Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (requiring a state to show a
.compelling" interest for abortion regulations during the first trimester).
The Court's more recent decisions do not directly address abortion funding but
may have had an indirect affect by restricting abortion generally. For example, in
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), the Court upheld Health and Human Re-
sources regulations that prohibited federally funded family planning clinics from
counseling or referring clients to abortion services, even upon the client's request
for such information. Although the Rust decision directly considered a federal fund-
ing restriction, the case was decided on First Amendment free speech grounds
rather than abortion rights. See, e.g., Note, The Policy Against Federal Funding
For Abortions Extends Into the Realm of Free Speech After Rust v. Sullivan, 19
PEPP. L. REV. 637 (1992).
15' 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
159 In Webster, the Court addressed several questions concerning abortion access,
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Court's weakening commitment to reproductive rights. Yet nei-
ther decision grants the government the right to assert an
unlimited interest in a first-trimester fetus.
The application of Casey's "undue burden" standard to
abortion restrictions implies that the Court is willing to accept
some obstacles to abortion access. Yet the Casey decision did
not clearly delineate a standard for determining which abor-
tion restrictions would place an undue burden on women
choosing abortion. As a result, lower courts face considerable
confusion as they try to address the issue of what constitutes
an "undue burden."6 ° Advocates challenging abortion restric-
including whether public hospitals had to provide abortion services at all. 492 U.S.
at 509. The Webster Court upheld a Missouri law prohibiting the use of public
hospitals or publicly employed physicians to provide abortion services. The Court
analogized the issue of providing abortion services via public hospitals to the abor-
tion funding issue and reasoned that since the state did not provide funding for
abortion services, women denied access to abortion at public hospitals would not
be any more disadvantaged by being forced to use a private practitioner. Id. The
Court stated that:
Just as Congress' refusal to fund abortions in McRae left 'an indigent
woman with at least the same range of choice in deciding whether to
obtain a medically necessary abortion as she would have had if Congress
had chosen to subsidize no health care costs at all,' Missouri's refusal to
allow public employees to perform abortions in public hospitals leaves a
pregnant woman with the same choices as if the State had chosen not to
operate any public hospitals at all.
Id.
The Court in Casey did not directly address the issue of abortion funding, but
considered generally restrictions on access to abortion. In Casey, the Court rejected
Roe's trimester framework and allowed the government to assert an interest in the
fetus before the third trimester of a woman's pregnancy. The Casey Court devel-
oped an "undue burden" test. This test permitted states to impose restrictions on
abortion before viability, as long as these restrictions did not constitute an "undue
burden" on women. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2820. Applying the undue burden test,
Casey declared that Pennsylvania's requirements of informed consent, 24-hour
waiting periods, parental consent and record-keeping and reporting requirements
did not impose undue burdens on women seeking abortions. Id. at 2822-25. The
Court, however, did strike as overly burdensome the state's requirement that a
married woman notify her spouse before obtaining an abortion. Id. at 2830.
1" "Casey is a splintered opinion, confusing abortion law . . . Abortion law
becomes even more unclear because the joint opinion explicitly rejects Roe's trimes-
ter framework and strict scrutiny standard while claiming to adhere to Roe's es-
sential holding." Schneider, supra note 83, at 1003; see also Patricia J. Williams,
Courtspeak: When is a Fundamental Right Not a Fundamental Right?, in CENTER
FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, REFLECTIONS AFTER CASEY 25, 27 (Dorothy M.
Zellner & Nancy Scerbo eds., 1993).
The undue burden standard had not been applied to abortion rights cases
before Casey and was more suggestive of an economic inquiry than privacy rights.
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tions under Casey must explore the factual impact of such
restrictions in an effort to show how these restrictions burden
women.'6' Although it has generally failed to recognize the
economic realities faced by low-income women with unwanted
pregnancies, the Court is beginning to acknowledge the enor-
mous impact of reproductive health laws on women's equali-
ty. 1
62
Ultimately, the Court has failed to recognize that any re-
striction on access to abortion will act as a total bar for some
women. For a woman who lives in a rural area where a doctor
performs abortions only one day a week, a 24-hour waiting
period may turn into a one-week delay. A one-week delay could
make her pregnancy too advanced for a legal abortion. Fur-
thermore, what may not be an undue burden for an upper- or
middle-income woman, may be a total bar to abortion access
for low-income women or teenagers. A woman forced to stay
overnight in a hotel or travel home and return during a 24-
hour waiting period may find the additional cost too high to
afford an abortion and be forced to carry an unwanted preg-
nancy to term.
Given the Court's previous disregard of the burdens faced
by low-income women trying to obtain abortion services, it is
unlikely that the Court will consider additional expenses alone
[O]ddly enough, undue burden is a term borrowed-as far as anyone can
tell, since O'Connor did not say what she meant by the term-from busi-
ness regulation. It's used to protest regulations that "unduly burden" the
profitable management of businesses.... Furthermore, undue burden has
a decidedly pecuniary base as its standard; traditionally, cases implying
this term have been referring to something that unduly taxes or that
leaves a disproportionate penalty.
Williams, supra, at 27.
161 An Analysis of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM IN
Focus (Center for Reproductive Law & Pol'y, New York, NY), 1993, at 6
("[L]itigators will need to present extensive facts to prove that a statute creates an
'undue burden.' As a result, courts will have broad discretion to decide whether a
challenged restriction is invalid.").
162 "More surprisingly at the time, the joint opinion of the breakaway Rea-
gan/Bush justices even acknowledged the impact of feminism.... .. Citing Rosalind
Petchesky, one of feminism's finest theorists on this subject, the opinion also rec-
ognized abortion as a crucial aspect of women's equality, noting that women's
,ability to 'participate equally in economic and social life of the Nation has been
facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives.' Rhonda Copelon,
From Rhetoric to Reality: The Challenge of Casey, in REFLECTIONS AFTER CASEY,
supra note 160, at 9, 10-11.
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as constituting an undue burden. If the Court is unwilling to
recognize or elaborate on the extreme hardship of such restric-
tions as a 24-hour waiting period or parental consent, it is
unlikely to find that a complete denial of abortion funding
places an undue burden upon low-income women. Although the
Court has maintained some limits on the state's interest in the
fetus, thereby recognizing the detrimental effects the restric-
tions have on individual women, its most recent reproductive
rights decisions do not appear to offer any support for abortion
funding for low-income women. Yet, the changing composition
of the Supreme Court indicates that in the future it may recog-
nize the discriminatory impact of a challenged law.
In addition, the Court appears affected by an increased
societal awareness of how sexism affects women's lives. The
Court itself has not been insulated from such concerns. During
the confirmation hearing of Justice Clarence Thomas, the
country focused its attention on the issue of sexual harassment
and, since that time, the Court has ruled on this issue with
increased awareness of the impact of sexual harassment on
women.
The Court's recent opinions reflect a growing awareness of
women's rights, particularly in the workplace. For example, in
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,"6 3 the Court evolved in its
Title VII analysis of a sex discrimination case, stating that a
"discriminatorily abusive work environment, even one that
does not seriously affect employees' psychological well-being,
can and often will detract from employees' job performance,
discourage employees from remaining on the job, or keep them
from advancing in their careers."'" Nonetheless, the Court
did not go as far as the standard proposed by Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, who noted that the "critical issue ... is
whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous
terms or conditions of employment to which members of the
other sex are not exposed."165
' 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
" Id. at 371.
" Id. at 372. (Bader Ginsburg, J., concurring). The Court also recently ac-
knowledged "what, by now, should be axiomatic: Intentional discrimination on the
basis of gender by state violates the Equal Protection Clause, particularly where,
as here, the discrimination serves to ratify and perpetuate invidious, archaic, and
overbroad stereotypes about the relative abilities of men and women." J.E.B. v.
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Despite its progress in the area of employment discrimina-
tion against women, the Court has been slow to combat gender
discrimination in the area of reproductive health law. The
majority of the justices are not committed to women's rights
and, indeed, those selected by then-Presidents Reagan and
Bush were chosen in part because of their anti-abortion view-
points. 16 6 The law traditionally has not been receptive to
women's equality, particularly because it has excluded women
and their experiences of pregnancy and childbearing. 67 Al-
though the Court may be making some progress in the realm
of gender equality, and will undoubtedly expand its recognition
of women's interests with the addition of Justice Ginsburg's
perspective, it cannot be relied upon to enact the type of
sweeping equal protection reform needed to facilitate women's
equality in society.
Instead of merely relying on the Court's slowly evolving
recognition of gender discrimination, the legislature must rec-
ognize equal protection guarantees in those areas in which
such protection has been weak-for example, with laws govern-
ing reproduction. The state's interest in the fetus is not "com-
pelling" if proper emphasis is given to the amendment's nega-
tive effects on women and the possibility of less-burdensome
alternatives. But until women's interests are valued, the detri-
mental effects of oppressive legislation will continue to be ignored.
The proposed national health care plan offers not only an
Alabama, 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1422 (1994). Although the Court gave greater recogni-
tion to gender discrimination than it had in any of its earlier decisions-for in-
stance, acknowledging similarities between gender and racial prejudices-it de-
clined to apply a strict level of scrutiny to gender classifications. Furthermore, the
"backlash" resulting from the Court's steps towards full recognition of gender dis-
crimination can be seen in Justice Scalia's scathingly sarcastic dissent. He at-
tempts to cling to the past by facetiously commenting: "Today's opinion is an in-
spiring demonstration of how thoroughly up-to-date and right-thinking we Justices
are in matters pertaining to the sexes ... and how sternly we disapprove the
male chauvinist attitudes of our predecessors. Id. at 1436 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
'" "Unlike their predecessors, Presidents Reagan and Bush, who selected at
least sixty percent of the nation's sitting federal judges, applied a specific anti-
abortion 'litmus test' for all federal court appointees." Ensuring Reproductive Free-
dom, supra note 18, at 31.
" "[Tihe interest, perceptions and experiences that have shaped the law have
not included those of women. The social conception of pregnancy that has formed
the basis for its legal treatment has not been from the point of view of the preg-
nant woman, but rather from the point of view of the observing outsider, gendered
male. " MacKinnon, supra note 73, at 1309.
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opportunity, but an obligation to reconsider abortion funding in
the broader context of gender discrimination. Since the Court
has been slow to grant women's rights, a legislative solution
may be a more effective-and more appropriate-method of
facilitating social equality for women.
III. NATIONAL HEALTH CARE AND THE FUTURE OF ABORTION
FUNDING
A. "Health is not simply the absence of sickness." 168
Debate over the proposed national health care plan will
inevitably include discussion of abortion services and funding.
The combination of a dramatic reorganization of health care
and the polarization of the abortion debate offers an occasion
for Congress to reconsider the issue of abortion funding. The
national health care plan presents an chance to secure full
reproductive health care and to "redress serious biases in the
existing system that prejudice true freedom of choice in child-
bearing."69 Any proposed federal health care plan should in-
clude coverage of abortion services.
In the legislature and on the grass-roots level, advocates
may take advantage of the increased attention on health care
to restructure the abortion issue so as to include low-income
women. The proponents of access to abortion services must
eradicate the financial barriers that prevent equal access to
abortion for low-income women. These barriers include funding
bans, physician shortages and the costs related to abortion.
Expanding the content and the context of the abortion debate
can make abortion part of a broader agenda for greater repro-
ductive rights-and an essential element of gender equality for
all women.
The focus of the debate should be on the continuum of
factors that restrict access to abortion for all women and, in
effect, deny low-income women the right to choose abortion. To
facilitate genuine reproductive freedom, Congress should reject
168 Hannah Green, quoted in QUOTATIONS BY WOMEN, supra note 1, at 147.
9 JEANNIE I. ROSOFF, HEALTH CARE REFORM: A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO PRO-
VIDE BALANCE AND EQUITY TO THE PROVISION OF REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH SERVICES
3 (1993).
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the current form of the abortion debate which positions women
in opposition to fetuses. A model for providing reproductive
health care must include a range of preventative services to
reduce unwanted pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases.
Such care must also include pre-natal care or abortion services,
and should facilitate conditions that allow a woman to make a
genuine choice.
The costs associated with obtaining abortion services cre-
ate just as difficult an obstacle for low-income women as the
costs of the abortion service itself. These costs include trans-
portation, access to a telephone, child care provisions and
missed hours at work.17° Any national health care plan that
hopes to provide all Americans with genuine health care must
not only abolish obstacles to services for those living in pover-
ty, but must take affirmative steps to ensure the availability of
reproductive health services.
Financial inequity is one such obstacle. Women in poverty
are at a great disadvantage when abortion services are less
available. Not surprisingly, women who can afford to travel
greater distances or pay for private care have greater access to
abortion. The Court must recognize this when it considers
whether restrictions place an undue burden on access to abor-
tion and should reject the idea that it is permissible to use
government funding to coerce recipients into choosing a partic-
ular type of care.
So too, a national health care system should reject abor-
tion restrictions such as those in Webster, which reduce the
number of providers and public hospital services. The need is
great for hospital services for abortion, particularly in rural
areas. Low-income women use public hospitals more than
wealthier women, in part because of discrimination in health
care. 7' The Court's decision in Webster allowing individual
170 See Vernellia R. Randall, Address at Ensuring (E)qual(ity) Health Care for
Poor Americans (Dec. 3, 1993) (symposium sponsored by the Edward V. Sparer
Public Interest Law Fellowship Program and the Brooklyn Law Review) (discussing
how barriers of economics, infrastructure, class, race, culture and communication
result in the failure of "universal coverage" to result in health care coverage for
low-income Americans) [hereinafter Randall Address]; see also Vernellia R. Randall,
Does Clinton's Health Care Reform Proposal Ensure (E)qual(ity) of Health Care for
Ethnic Americans and the Poor?, 60 BROOK. L. REv. 167 (1994).
" Randall Address, supra note 170 (discussing health care providers' biases
against treating low-income patients and the race bias in health care which results
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hospitals to refuse to provide women with these services cre-
ates even more barricades to health-care access for low-income
women.
A hospital's decision not to provide abortion services has a
broad negative effect on women's health care. Reproductive
health services are often the only way for a hospital to make
initial contact with women who may need general health care
but would not otherwise approach a hospital. Furthermore, it
is inappropriate to allow a hospital to make a decision as to
whether women in the community will have access to abortion
services. Any individual physician who is personally opposed to
abortion could be excused from performing them-for instance,
through a "conscience clause" provision. But to place such a
decision in the hands of an individual hospital further deprives
women of decision-making power about their own reproductive
health care and impedes the exercise of a constitutional right.
Therefore, the proposed national health care plan should facili-
tate patient care without allowing a patchwork delivery of
services based upon hospital politics.
A national system of health care delivery should diminish
the power of individual hospitals to determine what services
would be available to women. If the government is responsible
for the provision of health care services, individual hospitals
would not be able to mandate that they will not make abortion
services available. While individual doctors may opt out of
providing abortion services, a hospital itself could be required
to provide a full range of reproductive health care services.
The types of abortion regulation upheld in the Webster
decision contribute to the shortage of abortion providers, an
issue of vital importance to accessing abortion, particularly for
low-income women. As a result of anti-abortion pressures, the
number of physicians willing and able to provide abortion
services has decreased dramatically.72 This shortage is not
simply due to physicians' career choices, but is a result of sev-
in the situation where "the color of a person's skin affects the aggressiveness of
care received"); see also, Morgan, supra note 11, at Al (discussing practitioners
reluctance to treat Medicaid patients because of the "stigma that Medicaid cover-
age still has for many as a 'poor person's program' that many physicians have
shied from").
... See Lauran Neergaard, Community Pressure Has Made Rural Abortions Few
and Far Between, L.A. TIMES, June 28, 1992, at A24.
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eral policy decisions within the medical profession. Many medi-
cal schools no longer require nor even offer their students
training in abortion procedures.' Many students now at-
tending medical school grew up in a post-Roe era and, as a
result, assume that access to legal abortion will always exist.
In addition, because of the current state of the abortion debate,
young doctors decline to become abortion providers. In a pro-
fession which is so revered by society, many people are unwill-
ing to commit to an area of health care that has become so
stigmatized. 4
Finally, with the increase in violence and harassment
against abortion providers and clinic staff, many physicians
are no longer willing to remain in a profession in which they
are subject to such "pro-life" behavior.' The national health
care plan must acknowledge this shortage of abortion providers
and the resulting denial of reproductive health care choices for
women. The plan should seek to remedy the shortage by offer-
ing incentives to encourage physicians to provide abortion
services. To ensure women's access to abortion, the government
must also work to protect the rights of physicians against
threats and harassment by abortion opponents.'
As the Webster decision shows, the Supreme Court cannot
1 A University of California-Davis survey revealed that in 1991, only 12% of
obstetrics-gynecology programs in the United States offered routine, first-trimester
abortion training, and 31% offered none. Darlene Gavron Stevens, Abortion Doctors
Lying Low, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 2, 1993, at 1. This rate has sharply declined since
1985, when 23% offered routine abortion training. Id.
174 These observations are taken in part from a series of conversations with Dr.
Jane Hodgson, July 1993, whose insight and commitment to women's reproductive
health care are exemplary.
175 See Stevens, supra note 173, at 1.
17 Incidents of violence against abortion clinics have increased dramatically
since 1980. Examples of this violence include attacks on reproductive health care
clinics by firebombing, arson, and butyric acid-a toxic substance dangerous to
skin and respiratory systems. See Suspected Arson and Clinical Attacks at
Women's Health Clinics, REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM NEWS (Center for Reproductive
Law & Pol'y, New York, NY), Sept. 24, 1993, at 7. These attacks are aimed at
clinic staff, patients and facilities.
The Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, recently enacted by Congress,
allows peaceable protests against abortion clinics but prohibits protestors' ac-
tions-such as parking cars and chaining themselves to block clinic entrances-to
obstruct clinic entrances. States have also used "stalker" laws to prosecute abortion
protestors who harass abortion providers and their families. State trespassing laws
also have been used to remove protestors from the private property of clinics and
staff members.
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be relied upon to ensure that medical providers do not abandon
the provision of abortion services. The Court's reasoning in
Webster and Casey indicates that it will not consider cases on
the basis of the impact its rulings will have on women's equali-
ty. Webster echoed the Court's stated belief in Harris that the
government does not owe women access to health care and,
therefore, if a woman lacks health care services it is the fault
of her own poverty and cannot be blamed on the government.
The Court's rationale fails once the government begins provid-
ing health care on a national basis. If all Americans are cov-
ered by a single form of health care-regardless of what plan
this coverage ultimately follows-it will be more difficult to
treat low-income people's health care needs differently. Under
a single system of health care, the stigma of Medicaid will no
longer facilitate a distinct two-tiered system of health care
services.
Even if the Court expands its Harris rationale-that since
the government is not required to provide any health care
services it may choose which ones it .will provide-this opinion
is unlikely to be acceptable to most Americans. Although
Americans may expect recipients of public assistance to be
satisfied no matter how minimal the services provided are,
once the government begins to provide a service for the entire
nation, expectations will increase dramatically. Once the gov-
ernment becomes involved in the provision of all health care
services, it is unlikely that individuals will accept harsh limita-
tions on the types of services provided. Furthermore, since
ninety percent of all private health care insurance currently
provides abortion coverage, women will have an expectation of
continued coverage. 1"' If the government is presenting a plan
17 Ellen Goodman, Two Tiers for Women?, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 30, 1993, at 15
("Remember all those pro-choice voters? Remember the ones with health insurance?
They didn't send this administration to Washington to see their own choices di-
minished.").
Even if the government decided to abolish the existing inequality in
Medicaid's delivery of health care services, there is a greater likelihood that it will
expand health care provisions to bring greater equality rather than reducing the
amount of services provided. "While it is theoretically possible for a legislature to
respond to a holding that a classification violates equality norms by abolishing the
program or denying benefits equally to all, this is often politically unrealistic."
Rachel N. Pine & Sylvia A. Law, Envisioning A Future for Reproductive Liberty:
Strategies for Making the Rights Real, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 2, 420 n.48
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which accepts responsibility for providing all health care ser-
vices, then it cannot single out a particular necessary proce-
dure and deny women coverage nor create a separate private
market for this service.
B. The Future of the Abortion Debate
Abortion remains one of the most politically polarized
issues in America today. Nonetheless, the orchestrators of a
national health care system must not be allowed to sacrifice
women's health care to politics. Provisions that block access to
abortion negatively and unnecessarily affect women's health.
By delaying the abortion procedure for non-medical reasons,
they endanger women's health and needlessly increase the cost
of the procedure. The current Supreme Court does not consider
itself the proper governmental branch to enact widesweeping
social change. Therefore, activists must concentrate their advo-
cacy efforts on the legislative level. Legislative initiatives, such
as the proposed national health care system, demand a broad-
ening of the reproductive health debate into a larger agenda
for gender equality.
In the debate over reproductive rights, the pro-choice
movement must concentrate on equality rights generally, and
not become locked into a narrow debate over abortion rights. If
the debate over abortion access is going to result in greater
gender equality, it must concentrate on a wider range of social
and economic barriers that prevent women from gaining access
to not only abortion, but to fully equal status in society. Thus
far, by responding to the anti-abortion movement, women's
rights advocates have been "put in the position of having to
fight for something they need rather than want.""' By fram-
ing abortion rights as part of a larger agenda of women's re-
productive health care, women's rights advocates can broaden
its appeal to avoid championing a discourse about abortion
that has been accused of "flatten[ing] the sadness and com-
plexity of the issue" and becoming "caught up in a pitched
battle against pro-life language that [is] even more one dimen-
(1992).
17 Frances Olsen, Comment, Unraveling Compromise, 103 HARV. L. REV. 105,
123 (1989).
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sional."79 The abortion funding issue presents an opportunity
for women's rights advocates to address the reproductive
health care needs of all women, not just those who can private-
ly afford access to abortion.
If the government wants to influence women's reproductive
choices, it should do so by offering incentives rather than
through coercive funding measures. If the government's goal is
to prevent abortion by encouraging a woman to carry a preg-
nancy to term, it must do so by the least intrusive means. For
example, rather than restricting access to abortion, the govern-
ment should provide both pre-natal care and financial assis-
tance after birth so that a low-income woman is not forced to
choose abortion simply because she believes she cannot support
a child. Additionally, states should avoid policies such as those
which encourage abortion through denial of increases in AFDC
benefits if a recipient has additional children.
The denial of federal funding of abortion poignantly dem-
onstrates that the needs of large groups of wom-
en-particularly low-income and women of color-have been
overlooked in the abortion debate. Within the framework of the
current abortion debate, even if the right to abortion is won,
the more pressing issues of access to abortion and reducing the
need for abortion are not adequately addressed.
The debate over health care reform raises the question of
how to guarantee genuinely equal access to quality health care
for everyone in the United States.8 ° Regardless of the form it
takes, a national health care system must have two crucial
components: genuine access and genuine choice. Genuine ac-
cess to health care services involves far more than simply
providing health insurance. Genuine choice in the type of care
one receives requires patient autonomy. The issues surround-
ing federal funding of abortion services demonstrate that
health care issues do not exist in isolation. A successful nation-
al health care plan cannot ignore the social conditions that
contribute to poor health.
The conditions of poverty often prevent low-income people
179 NAOMI WOLF, FIRE wrrH FIE 129 (1993).
1" The debate over whether undocumented workers and "illegal aliens" should
be eligible for coverage under the new health care system shows the complexity of
the health care debate as it relates to other areas of American policies, such as
immigration.
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from gaining genuine access to health care even when, theoret-
ically, they have health insurance. For instance, as discussed
earlier, "out of pocket" expenses-such as high insurance de-
ductibles, transportation and child care costs-often are un-
manageable for families in poverty. Language and cultural
differences between health care providers and low-income
patients also often act as barriers to health care. In addition,
physician shortages in areas of rural or urban poverty severely
limit health care access for low-income people.
Genuine access to quality health care requires patients
having information and independent control to determine their
own health care choices. Genuine choice also must be in-
formed, but not by forced exposure to anti-abortion rhetoric,
harassment or other interference. A genuine choice about abor-
tion includes the resources and the right to make such a deci-
sion without interference by the government or other political
organizations. This choice includes a woman being able to
independently make her decision without being forced to go
through an obstacle course of abortion restrictions as her preg-
nancy advances. The national health care plan presents an
occasion to provide reproductive health care for all women as a
vital step toward gender equality.
CONCLUSION
The issue of funding for abortion services is central to
gender equality for all women. The denial of funding for abor-
tion excludes some women from obtaining abortion services
and perpetuates gender stereotypes about all women. Because
abortion restrictions affect all women as a class, challenges to
such laws provide the Court with a chance to expand equal
protection guarantees. The Court should seize the opportunity
to facilitate gender equality by modifying equal protection
doctrine. The Court should declare gender to be a suspect class
and should examine legislation that classifies by gender to
determine its practical impact, not the legislators' intentions in
passing the law.
Since the Court has been so reluctant to increase women's
equality, particularly in the area of reproductive rights, the
legislative branch must move to create greater equality. The
proposed national health care plan offers a chance to create
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greater gender equality by providing women with a full range
of reproductive health care services and choices. Women's re-
productive health care is an essential element of gender equali-
ty and, therefore, the government should focus its efforts on
facilitating, not impeding, women's access to such vital ser-
vices.
Julie F. Kay...
181 The author wishes to thank Kathryn Kolbert, Simon Heller, and especially
Professor Elizabeth Schneider of Brooklyn Law School, for their assistance with
this Note.
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